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COOPERATIVES: THE FIRST SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
Elaine Waterhouse Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether it is racial inequality,1 gun control,2 or reforming democ-
racy,3 commentators urge philanthropy to solve seemingly intractable
social problems.  This is also true with one of the most talked-about
current global issues: income inequality.4
Many in the charitable sector view income inequality as an issue
they must address and one in which the sector has a significant role to
play.5  If charitable organization6 is so inclined to tackle the issue of
income inequality, there are a number of ways it can proceed.  Tradi-
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Series at the August 2016 meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, which was
moderated by Neil Buchanan and mentored by Terri Helge.  Thanks to those friends, mentors,
and colleagues that suffered through this process with me, especially Joshua Fershe´e, Atiba Ellis,
Jena Martin, Valarie Blake, Kendra Huard Fershe´e, Melanie Stimling, and Anthony Ray for his
insightful commentary on the structure of law review articles.  Finally, I would like to thank the
Bloom Fund (officially, the Kanawha County Class Action Settlement 2009 Charitable Trust) for
its support of this research project.
1. Amy Schiller, How Philanthropy Can Show that Black Lives Matter, CHRON. PHILAN-
THROPY (July 21, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Opinion-How-Philanthropy-Can/
237202.
2. Pablo Eisenberg, Grant Makers Could Help Push Gun Control to Forefront of Public Pol-
icy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Opinion-No-
Matter-What-Your/237432?cid=pt&utm_source=pt&utm_medium=en&elqTrackId=630b80b6c
80d46258244b86d0406e3cf&elq=4ca8e45b19a043feab6e239835589333&elqaid=10219&elqat=1&
elqCampaignId=3817.
3. Robert L. Gallucci, Philanthropy Must Help Heal the Breakdown in Democracy, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Philanthropy-Must-Help-
Heal/154215.
4. Mark Rosenman, Fighting Income Inequality Should Be Top Nonprofit Priority, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Fighting-Income-Inequal-
ity/153773; Dane Stangler, Philanthropies Should Address Inequality, Seriously, REAL CLEAR
MKTS. (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2015/08/06/philanthropies_must_
address_inequality_seriously__101769.html.
5. See Rosenman, supra note 4 (“There is no policy area in which the voice of nonprofit orga- R
nizations is more critical than in affecting legislators’ deliberations regarding economic inequal-
ity and poverty.”); Brad Smith, Philanthropy’s Difficult Dance with Inequality, PHILANTHROPY
NEWS DIG. (June 16, 2015), http://pndblog.typepad.com/pndblog/2015/06/philanthropys-difficult-
dance-with-inequality.html (“[Private foundations are] free to take risks, experiment, support
1013
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tionally, a private foundation could fund scholarship or empirical
studies on the issues of divisions of wealth and poverty.  For example,
the Russell Sage Foundation has an extensive grant program support-
ing research on “the extent to which increased inequality has affected
equality of opportunity, social mobility, and the intergenerational
transmission of advantage.”7  Alternatively, organizations like Dc¸mos
engage in direct activity designed to fight income inequality, including
advocacy, public interest litigation, education, and social services.8
Other charities, however, prefer to support businesses that provide
innovative solutions to income inequality directly by offering eco-
nomic opportunity and sustainability to at-risk populations.  Referred
to as mission-related investing, this type of support can take the form
of loans or direct equity investments in for-profit entities that offer an
alternative to traditional business models.  For example, the recent
market crash caused the H.B. Heron Foundation to fundamentally al-
ter its approach when addressing poverty issues by moving away from
traditional grant making and instead “focus[ing] primarily on invest-
ing in enterprises that create reliable income streams for people striv-
ing to get out of poverty.”9
innovators, and stick with seemingly intractable challenges for the long haul.  This makes them
ideally suited to tackle what may be the most intractable challenge of all—inequality.”).
6. For purposes of this Article, except as otherwise noted, the term “charitable organization”
or “charity” means an entity that is organized as a non-profit organization under applicable state
law and which has obtained Internal Revenue § 501(c)(3) status, recognizing that an organiza-
tion may be exempt under § 501(c)(3) as educational or scientific, as opposed to charitable,
specifically.  All references to the Code mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as from time
to time amended.
7. Funding Opportunity: Social Inequality, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND., http://www.russellsage.org/
research/funding/social-inequality (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  Following the lead of the Ford
Foundation, the Weingart Foundation recently announced that it would focus its grant program
on issues of equity, including “serving those low-income people and communities most impacted
by inequity.”  Ruth McCambridge, Another Foundation Goes All In on Equity—Not Only the
What and Why, But the How, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/
08/17/another-foundation-goes-all-in-on-equity-not-only-the-what-and-why-but-the-how/; Ruth
McCambridge, Inequality, the Ford Foundation, and Humility, NONPROFIT Q. (June 15, 2015),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/06/15/inequality-the-ford-foundation-and-humility/.
8. See, e.g., Amy Traub, Poverty Pay and CEO Windfalls: Why Fast Food Is the Most Unequal
Industry in the US Economy, DEMOS (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.demos.org/publication/poverty-
pay-and-ceo-windfalls-why-fast-food-most-unequal-industry-us-economy; see also Rick Pender,
Win/Win: Collective Impact Brings Employers and Workers Together to Build a Stronger Com-
munity, SOAPBOX CIN. (July 19, 2016), http://www.soapboxmedia.com/features/071916-GCF-spe-
cial-report-collective-impact-workforce-2.aspx.
9. The Evolution of Heron, HERON, http://heron.org/enterprise (last visited Jan. 14, 2017); see
Impact Investing, MCKNIGHT FOUND., https://www.mcknight.org/impact-investing (last visited
Jan. 14, 2017); see also Find, Fund and Support Exceptional Leaders with Passion, Tenacity and
Vision, DRAPER RICHARDS KAPLAN FOUND., http://www.drkfoundation.org/model.html (last
visited Jan. 14, 2017).  More generally, a recent study by Commonfund and the Council on Foun-
dations shows that eighty-three percent of all private foundations responding to the survey said
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From the charity’s perspective, engaging an issue such as income
inequality through investment is no easy task.  First, the organization
must determine that the project it wants to fund has a charitable ele-
ment, which can be problematic in the area of economic develop-
ment.10  Then, if a charity is willing to forgo normal market
investment returns in order to further charitable goals, the charity
must establish that the investment furthers its tax-exempt purposes in
a manner other than simply earning income.11  It can be difficult to
separate a charity’s investment return needs from its tax-exempt pur-
pose; it can be similarly difficult to separate a business’s charitable
activities from its profit-oriented ones.
As charities increasingly pursue mission-related investing, for-profit
entities attempt to make a profit while having positive impacts on the
community and the environment.  This desire for businesses to have a
positive community impact has given rise to the concept of “social
enterprise,” which is loosely defined as the use of for-profit business
models and methods to achieve results that are beneficial to the gen-
eral public.12  Striving for this double or triple bottom line return,
however, is not without its own problems; there is an inherent tension
between providing a profit for shareholders while spending money on
charitable endeavors.  In order to alleviate these concerns, many
states have recently adopted two new types of business entities specifi-
cally designed to operate social enterprises: low profit limited liability
companies (L3Cs) and benefit corporations.13
their investment policies contemplated mission-related investing. COMMONFUND INST. & COUN-
CIL ON FOUNDS., STUDY OF RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 3–5 (2016), https://www.commonfund.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Foundations-Responsible-Investing-Press-Release-07-14-16.pdf.
10. For discussion of charitable economic development under § 501(c)(3), see infra Section
III.B.
11. While traditional notions of the fiduciary duty of care required the managers of a charita-
ble endowment only to consider returns when making an investment, the modern trend allows
an endowment to consider environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors when investing.
See Susan N. Gary, Values and Value: University Endowments, Fiduciary Duties, and ESG In-
vesting, 42 J.C. & U.L. 247, 248–51 (2016).  Notably, a charity engaged in ESG investing is not
necessarily settling for a lower return on investment in order to accomplish non-investment
goals; rather, “an investor with no interest in addressing social or environmental problems could
use ESG investing as a strategy to seek better returns . . . .” Id. at 263.
12. Dana Brakman Reiser uses the term “blended enterprise” to refer to “an entity that in-
tends to pursue profits and social good both in tandem and by making considered choices to
pursue one over the other.”  Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission
Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (2010).  Anthony Page and Robert Katz state that “‘Social
Enterprise’ is a loose term for business that aim to generate profits while advancing social
goals.”  Anthony Page & Robert Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsi-
bility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2011).
13. For discussion of social enterprise and each new entity, see infra Section IV.B.  While the
benefit corporation is the most popular of the social enterprise models in corporate form, some
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Especially in the context of income inequality, however, the oppor-
tunity to invest directly in alternative for-profit solutions has a third
option: cooperatives.  The modern cooperative business model devel-
oped in direct response to social unrest, unemployment, poverty, and
inequality.14  Community benefit is not just a consequence of the co-
operative business model; it is a fundamental part of its structure.  Yet
the cooperative is a for-profit entity, and therefore not exclusively
charitable.  As a result, the charitable sector can look to cooperatives
as a social enterprise-based solution to important and seemingly in-
tractable social issues, such as income inequality.
A cooperative is a business entity that is owned and managed by its
members—those individuals for whose benefit the cooperative was or-
ganized.  These members may be individual laborers in a workers’ co-
operative,15 farmers in an agricultural marketing coop,16 or consumers
in search of organic and fair trade produce at the local food coop.17
Unlike the standard investor capital-based business organization
(sometimes referred to as an investor-owned firm or IOF), a coopera-
tive’s mission is not necessarily to make a profit or to increase share-
holder value;18 rather, the cooperative’s mission is to serve the needs
of its members, whomever and whatever they may be.  Historically,
these members have often been a class of individuals in need of assis-
tance, such as the unemployed weavers of the Rochdale cooperative
or the poor farmers in California studied by Aaron Sapiro.19  Because
the history of the cooperative is rooted in social change, the coopera-
states have developed a different model for social enterprise corporations.  For example, Califor-
nia has a “social purpose corporation” (formerly known as a flexible purpose corporation”).
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2600–2605 (West 2014).  Delaware has the public benefit corporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2015).  While these alternative forms differ substantively from
benefit corporations, the term “benefit corporation,” as used in this Article, includes these other
variations of social enterprise corporate forms for purposes of brevity.
14. For the history of the modern cooperative movement, see infra Section II.A.3.
15. The world’s largest workers’ cooperative is widely believed to be The Mondragon Cooper-
ative Group in the Basque region of Spain, which started in 1956 with twenty-four workers.
Mondragon now has eight-five thousand workers and worldwide assets worth _33 billion. CLAU-
DIA SANCHEZ BAJO & BRUNO ROELANTS, CAPITAL AND THE DEBT TRAP 176–77 (2013).
16. See, e.g., About Us, W.V. FARMERS, INC., https://wvhemp.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan.
14, 2017).
17. See, e.g., MOUNTAIN PEOPLE’S CO-OP, https://mountainpeoplescoop.com/ (last visited Jan.
14, 2017).
18. Stephen Bainbridge, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corporations-obligations-to-shareholders/a-
duty-to-shareholder-value (“[C]orporate directors are bound by ‘fiduciary duties and standards’
which include ‘acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders.’”)
19. For discussion of the Rochdale Pioneers, see infra Section II.A.1.  For discussion of Aaron
Sapiro’s marketing cooperatives, see infra Section II.B.1.
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tive movement has developed a set of internationally recognized val-
ues that emphasize democracy, community, equality and
sustainability, which are inherent to all cooperatives.
Due to their member-focused mission, cooperatives have difficulty
obtaining capital from profit-oriented sources.  Foundations and other
charitable organizations looking to make social enterprise investments
may be able to fill this funding gap.  By definition, the goal of a mis-
sion-related investment by a charity is to achieve a charitable goal,
sometimes while making a profit and sometimes while intentionally
sacrificing profit.20  While a charitable investor is still just an investor
in, and not a member of, a cooperative, the charitable investor’s goals
and the member-owners’ goals can still be in alignment.  If the charita-
ble investor can assure itself that the cooperative business model is, at
least in part, “charitable,” then it can find a way to invest in coopera-
tives in the same manner as it might invest in a benefit corporation or
a L3C (or for that matter, any for-profit business with a distinct chari-
table activity).21
This is not to say that cooperatives, specifically, or social enter-
prises, generally, are the solution to all that ails; rather, the intention
is to find a place for cooperatives in the dialogue about social enter-
prise.  As the cooperative and social enterprise movements merge, it is
necessary to examine the legal and tax structures governing the enti-
ties to see if they help or hinder growth.  If the ultimate decision is to
support the growth of cooperatives as social enterprise, then those le-
gal and tax structures that might impede this progress need to be re-
examined.
This Article considers some of the issues that may impede the chari-
table sector in supporting the growth of the cooperative business
model as a potential solution to issues of income inequality.  To do so,
the Article first defines a “cooperative.”  Part II examines the defini-
tion of a cooperative from three different viewpoints: cooperative as
social movement, cooperative as economic arrangement, and coopera-
tive as legal construct.  From these definitions, it is possible to identify
those elements inherent in the cooperative model that might qualify
as a tax-exempt purpose under the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)
§ 501(c)(3).  Part III reviews the definition of “charitable” for
§ 501(c)(3) purposes, specifically in the context of economic develop-
20. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible? The Legal Rules for Charities that
Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 106,
108 (2011) [hereinafter Is It Prudent to Be Responsible].
21. For a discussion of charitable investments in L3Cs and benefit corporations, see infra Sec-
tion IV.B.
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ment and the support of workers.  This Part demonstrates that many
of the values inherent in the cooperative model are, in fact, charitable
as that term is understood for federal tax purposes.
If a cooperative has charitable elements, however, then it should be
possible for the charitable sector to support the cooperative move-
ment.  Part IV analyzes the possibilities and limitations of direct sup-
port by the charitable sector, including mission-related investing by
charities and program-related investing by private foundations.  In
this regard, the cooperative can be viewed in many respects as an ex-
isting analog to the new social enterprise forms, such as the benefit
corporation or the L3C.  Finally, Part V provides recommendations
for changing both federal and state law to further support the cooper-
ative movement in the charitable sector.
II. WHAT IS A COOPERATIVE?
Any discussion of cooperatives begs the question: What exactly is a
cooperative?  Historically, cooperatives are an integral part of a social
movement to address issues of sustainable and socially-responsible
business practices in response to the perceived excesses of capitalism.
Alternatively, a cooperative is a specific type of economic arrange-
ment undertaken by individuals with a common need and a social
bond.  Finally, a cooperative is a legal construct—a business entity as
defined for purposes of a specific law or as authorized by state statute.
These three distinctly different approaches to defining the cooperative
ultimately result in at least one area of agreement: The cooperative, as
a matter of structure and not merely of consequence, embraces the
goal of benefitting the community, both directly and indirectly
through bettering the circumstances of its members.  The following
parts of this Part II review the three different ways one can define a
cooperative: as a social movement, as an economic relationship, and
as a legal construct.
A. Cooperatives as Social Movement
1. The Birth of Cooperatives
While cooperative forms of business enterprises date back to the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,22 the concept of the modern co-
operative originated in England with the Rochdale Pioneers in 1844.23
22. KIMBERLY A. ZEULI & ROBERT CROPP, COOPERATIVES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2004).
23. See Time Machine, ROCHDALE PIONEERS MUSEUM, http://www.rochdalepioneersmuseum
.coop/time-machine/#fifth (last visited Jan. 14, 2017); see also History of the Co-operative Move-
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Many of the Rochdale Pioneers were weavers or otherwise involved
in the textile industry.24  As tradesmen, the Pioneers “suffer[ed] from
the social dislocations of the industrial revolution” and depended
upon “merchants who were sometimes unscrupulous, who exploited
the helplessness of the poor by selling at high prices [and] by adulter-
ating goods.”25  To address these issues, the Pioneers established what
we would now know to be a purchasing cooperative, opening a gen-
eral store that was available to and run by all of its members.
The cooperative was specifically set up “to form arrangements for
the pecuniary benefit and improvement of the social and domestic
condition of its members . . . .”26  According to the Rochdale Pioneer
Museum, which conserves the original coop store building, Rochdale
is widely regarded as the home of the modern worldwide cooperative
movement.27  This is not because it was the first consumer cooperative
venture, but because its Pioneers (the cooperative’s founders) laid
down the first comprehensive, written model of the values and princi-
ples that set out how, and why, to run a cooperative society.”28  The
original model of the Rochdale Principles was as follows:
• That capital should be of their own providing and bear a fixed
rate of interest.
• That only the purest provisions procurable should be supplied to
members
• That full weight and measure should be given.
• That market prices should be charged and no credit given nor
asked.
• That profits should be divided pro rata upon the amount of
purchases made by each member.
• That the principle of ‘one member one vote’ should obtain in gov-
ernment and the equality of the sexes in membership.
• That the management should be in the hands of officers and com-
mittee elected periodically.
• That a definite percentage of profits should be allotted to
education.
ment, INT’L COOPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/history-co-operative-move
ment (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  Soon thereafter, Germans formed cooperative credit unions in
1862. See Erdis W. Smith, Federal Credit Unions: Origin and Development, SOC. SEC. BULL.,
Nov. 1955, at 3, 3–4.
24. See The Rochdale Pioneers, ROCHDALE PIONEERS MUSEUM, http://www.rochdalepioneer-
smuseum.coop/about-us/about-the-pioneers/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
25. BRETT FAIRBAIRN, THE MEANING OF ROCHDALE: THE ROCHDALE PIONEERS AND THE
CO-OPERATIVE PRINCIPLES 2 (1994), http://usaskstudies.coop/documents/occasional-papers/
Meaning%20of%20Rochdale.pdf.
26. Id. at 5.
27. See The Rochdale Pioneers, supra note 24. R
28. The Pioneers’ Rule Book 1844, ROCHDALE PIONEERS MUSEUM, http://www.rochdalepio
neersmuseum.coop/about-us/1844-rule-book/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
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• That frequent statement and balance sheets should be presented
to members.29
As one commentator noted, the problems faced by the Pioneers in
1844 in some ways resemble those in developing countries and less
developed communities today.30  “The solutions in Rochdale look
something like the modern idea of socially sustainable development:
in the most general terms, Rochdale stands for development in the
long-term interests of people and communities—development con-
trolled by the people it affects.  Rochdale is a vision of participation in
social change.”31
2. Cooperatives in the United States
In the United States, the cooperative business model has histori-
cally enjoyed more limited success.  “Cooperatives are neither indige-
nous to the United States, nor are they an American invention. . . .
[C]ooperatives in the United States are both an artifact of early set-
tlers’ European heritage and a collective response to harsh living con-
ditions.”32  As a matter of historical artifact, the most accomplished
cooperatives in the United States are primarily active in agriculture.33
However, it may be that the limited success of cooperatives in the
non-agricultural sectors in the United States is about to change.  Co-
operatives are attracting greater attention as a solution to social issues
and an as alternative economic arrangement to traditional
capitalism.34
As new immigrants came to the United States, they brought the
Rochdale Principles with them.  While the first cooperative business
in the United States was a mutual fire insurance company founded in
29. The Rochdale Principles, ROCHDALE PIONEERS MUSEUM, http://www.rochdalepioneers
museum.coop/about-us/the-rochdale-principles/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
30. FAIRBAIRN, supra note 25, at 1. R
31. Id.
32. See ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 15. R
33. See id. (“[S]ome of the most significant contributions Americans have made to the cooper-
ative model and movement have been in the agricultural sector . . . .”). See generally Coopera-
tives in the U.S., CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES, www.UWCC.wisc.edu/whatisacoop/history (last
visited Jan. 14, 2017).  For further discussion of the development of the agricultural marketing
cooperative in the United States, see ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 16. R
34. See, e.g., E.G. NADEAU, THE COOPERATIVE SOLUTION: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN
TAME RECESSIONS, REDUCE INEQUALITY, AND PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 4–6 (2012); Chris-
topher Wright, Worker Cooperatives and Revolution: History and Possibilities in the United
States (Dec. 2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Massachusetts Boston), http://scho-
larworks.umb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=masters_theses.
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1752 by Benjamin Franklin,35 it was generally followed by a series of
local dairy and agricultural cooperatives formed by European immi-
grants primarily located in the Northeast.36
By 1875, the Order of the Patrons of Husbandry—more popularly
known as the Grange—adopted the Rochdale Principles set forth in
the United Kingdom earlier in the decade.37  During the 1920s and
into the Great Depression, Congress repeatedly supported agricul-
tural cooperatives.  Early federal support included exempting cooper-
atives from the application of the federal antitrust laws,38 enacting the
Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926 and the Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1929 to support cooperative organization and infrastructure,39
and passing the Farm Credit Act in 1933, which created a lending sys-
tem40 that addressed the needs of agricultural cooperatives during the
Great Depression.41
3. Cooperatives Today
Throughout nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cooperatives devel-
oped as tools for social movement.  This growth continues to this day,
when cooperatives are even more prevalent as vehicles of social
initiatives.
Today, the cooperative movement is internationally represented by
the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), which “unites co-op-
eratives worldwide.”42  The ICA defines a cooperative as “an autono-
35. See NAT’L COOP. MONTH PLANNING COMM., COOPERATIVE BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED
STATES: A 2005 SNAPSHOT 2 (2005), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/stats/uscoopbus05.pdf; see
also ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 15. R
36. BOB CROPP & TRUMAN GRAF, THE HISTORY AND ROLE OF DAIRY COOPERATIVES 2–3
(2001), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/dairy/history.pdf; ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 16. R
37. ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 16. R
38. Capper–Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (2012).  For further discussion, see ZEULI &
CROPP, supra note 22 at 17–19. R
39. Cooperative Marketing Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 451–457 (2012).  For further discussion, see
ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 18. R
40. Agricultural Marketing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1141–1141j (2012).  For further discussion, see
ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 18. R
41. This history of private, public, and legislative support is not found, however, for other
types of non-agricultural cooperatives in the United States, such as worker and consumer coop-
eratives. See generally Wright, supra note 34, at 81–130 (providing a brief history of workers’ R
cooperatives in the United States from a Marxist perspective); see also USFWC History, U.S.
FED’N WORKER COOPERATIVES, https://usworker.coop/about/usfwc/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
42. Vision and Mission, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://ica.coop/en/basics/vision-mis-
sion (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  The ICA’s full mission statement is stated as follows:
It is the custodian of co-operative values and principles and makes the case for their
distinctive values-based economic business model which also provides individuals and
communities with an instrument of self-help and influence over their development.
The ICA advocates the interests and success of co-operatives, disseminates best prac-
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mous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common
economic, social, and cultural needs and aspiration through a jointly-
owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.”43  According to the
ICA, cooperatives are “member-owned, member-run, and member-
serving businesses.”44  Under its definition, a cooperative is not a spe-
cific type of business entity for legal purposes; rather, it could be any
legal entity formed by persons united by a common need that is
jointly-owned and democratically controlled.  The ICA posits that co-
operatives are “business driven by values not just profit,” and that
they share “internationally agreed principles and act together to build
a better world through co-operation.”
The ICA sets forth six cooperative values—self-help, self-responsi-
bility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidary—and state that “co-
operative members believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness,
social responsibility, and caring for others.”45  In furtherance of these
values, the ICA adopted seven cooperative principles, which are
based in significant part on the principles originally set forth by the
Rochdale Pioneers: (1) voluntary and open membership; (2) demo-
cratic member control (3) member economic participation; (4) auton-
omy and independence; (5) education, training and information; (6)
cooperation among cooperatives; and (7) concern for community.46
As such, the goal of the movement cooperative is not simply profit
or economic development.  Rather, the ICA articulates sustainable
development goals for cooperatives that are based on people-centered
messages.47  The cooperative is more than simply a way to organize
economic activity or to govern business arrangements; it is a collective
way to encourage community betterment and social change.
tices and know-how, strengthens their capacity building and monitors their perform-
ance and progress over time.
Id.  Additionally, the ICA’s vision is “[t]o be prized as the organisation of reference which pro-
vides an effective and efficient global voice and forum for knowledge, expertise and co-ordi-
nated action for and about co-operatives.” Id.
43. What Is a Co-operative?, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://ica.coop/en/what-co-oper-
ative (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
44. Facts and Figures, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://ica.coop/en/facts-and-figures
(last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
45. Co-operative Identity, Values & Principles, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://
ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
46. What Is a Co-operative?, supra note 43; see also JAMES R. BAARDA, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., R
CURRENT ISSUES IN COOPERATIVE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE 11–12 (2006).
47. See Sustainable Development Goals, INT’L COOPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://ica.coop/en/
sustainable-development-goals (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  The five messages include poverty
eradication and zero hunger, food security, gender equality, decent work and economic growth,
and combating climate change. Id.
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B. The Cooperatives as Economic Arrangement
1. Historical Development
The Rochdale Pioneers founded their cooperative for distinctly eco-
nomic reasons: They explicitly intended to better the economic cir-
cumstances of their members.  The Rochdale cooperative’s mission
was “to form arrangements for the pecuniary benefit, and improve-
ment of the social and domestic condition of its members . . . .”48  By
all accounts, they were quite successful in doing so.49
From its inception in 1844, the cooperative had an inherently dual
mission—to serve the social needs of its community and to serve as an
economic arrangement among its members.  One commentator has
referred to this as the “double nature” of cooperatives, originally at-
tributed to the German economist Georg Draheim: “According to this
concept, every cooperative represents simultaneously (1) an associa-
tion of persons in the sense of sociology and social psychology (i.e.,
social group), and (2) a joint enterprise, owned and operated by the
same members of the group.”50
This dichotomy of purpose explains the difference between the co-
operative as social movement and the cooperative as economic ar-
rangement.  “Social philosophers emphasize democratic control in the
form of one-person, one-vote as the cardinal principle of cooperation.
Economic philosophers on the other hand emphasize the distribution
of benefits in proportion to use as the cardinal principle.”51  “These
differences have been frequently articulated by cooperative leaders
such as Jerry Voorhis, who felt the service component of the coopera-
tive would be lost if a cooperative strictly advocates a ‘bottom line’
orientation.”52
In the United States, the debate over the role of the cooperative as
economic arrangement dates back to the post-industrial revolution era
economy and, specifically, to the agriculture sector.  At that time, two
influential commentators, Aaron Sapiro and Edwin G. Nourse, de-
bated the appropriate structure of U.S. agricultural cooperatives.53
48. The Pioneers’ Rule Book 1844, supra note 28. R
49. Id.
50. Vladislav Valentinov, Toward a Social Capital Theory of Cooperative Organization, 37 J.
COOPERATIVE STUD. 5, 5 (2004).
51. Randall E. Torgerson et al., Evolution of Cooperative Thought, Theory, and Purpose, U.
WIS. CTR.COOPERATIVES, http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/torg.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (ci-
tations omitted) (citing PAUL LAMBERT, STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF CO-OPERA-
TION (1963)).
52. Torgerson et al., supra note 51.  See generally JERRY VOORHIS, COOPERATIVE ENTER- R
PRISE: THE LITTLE PEOPLE’S CHANCE IN A WORLD OF BIGNESS (1975).
53. See Cooperatives in the U.S., supra note 33. R
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Sapiro advocated for farmer cooperatives organized around a single
commodity.54  In his view, commodity-focused cooperatives centered
on joint marketing efforts would “allow producers to capture greater
market share and achieve better prices for the farmer.”55  To further
this view, Sapiro (a lawyer) developed one of the first uniform laws
addressing cooperatives—the Standard Marketing Act.56  Alterna-
tively, Nourse advocated for smaller, locally-owned cooperatives that
were geographically based, rather than commodity-based, with a
strong emphasis on community.57
Whether one subscribed to either Shapiro’s monopolistic view or
Nourse’s competitive view of cooperatives, “[a] characteristic of
American thought is that it is steeped in pragmatism in contrast to
some European schools that were immersed in great social reforms
and associated philosophies of the times.“58  Unlike the European
model, the American view of cooperatives at the turn of the century
emphasized the economic half, rather than social half, of the coopera-
tive’s “double nature.”59  That does not mean, however, that Ameri-
can cooperatives did not play a role in social development.  At the end
of his seminal work, True Farmer Cooperation, Aaron Sapiro, stated:
But the solving of the financial problems for the growers of our
great crops is not the primary accomplishment of cooperative
marketing.
. . . .
Money accumulated in a banking institution for the sole purpose
of the interest accruing is an infirmity; but an increasing bank ac-
count helping to realize higher dreams is a moral asset.
The justification of cooperative marketing is that it has been the
means of a more progressive form of living and superior type of
citizenship, as well as an economic remedy.60
54. See generally Aaron Sapiro, True Farmer Cooperation: The California Plan of Cooperative
Marketing.  How It Differs from the Rochdale Plan. “Locality” vs. “Commodity.” Organization
and Financing, 8 J. AGRIC. COOPERATION 81, 81 (1993).
55. Cooperatives in the U.S., supra note 33; see also Sapiro, supra note 54, at 81. R
56. For a more in-depth discussion, see supra Section II.C.3.  The law formed the basis for
many early state statutes, as well as the Capper–Volstead Act—the federal law that exempted
farmers’ cooperatives from the federal antitrust laws. See ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 19. R
57. The goal of these cooperatives was not to monopolize the market and drive up commodity
prices; rather, Nourse envisioned cooperatives as competitors in the commodity market, captur-
ing “only enough market share to promote competition.” Cooperatives in the U.S., supra note
33; see also ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 20. R
58. Torgerson et al., supra note 51. R
59. See id.
60. Sapiro, supra note 54, at 93. R
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2. Modern Economic Thought
From its roots in economic agricultural thought, modern economists
have developed a number of theories underlying the development of
the cooperative business model.61  Current economic thought empha-
sizes a transaction cost approach to business arrangements such as co-
operatives.62  Under this model, “the main benefits of collective
organization derived by cooperatives are achieved by internalizing
crucial transactions into a firm jointly owned by the holders of trans-
action-specific resources.”63  This model emphasizes joint ownership
and democratic control as key drivers in reducing transaction costs,
thereby making transactions more efficient for the members of the
cooperative than they would have been acting individually.
Democracy is, however, messy—and expensive.  A cooperative’s
transaction costs may in fact be higher than a traditional IOF because
of the one member, one vote management model.  According to one
commentator, the high cost of cooperative democracy is offset by the
cooperative’s “social capital.”64  Social capital is defined as that set of
common norms and experiences among the stakeholders of a firm that
give rise to value within a firm.65  As a result, the homogeneity of the
membership of a cooperative gives the cooperative entity social capi-
tal, which smooths the way (and lowers the cost) of democratic man-
agement mechanisms.  Under this theory, the social element of the
cooperative is critical to the success of the business arrangement.
Without a set of common goals and a shared commitment to the gen-
61. See Vlanetinov supra note 50, at 5.  Emilianoff, Robotka, and Phillips viewed the coopera- R
tive as a pure agency among members. Id. at 5 nn.4, 5 & 6 (citing IVAN V. EMELIANOFF, ECO-
NOMIC THEORY OF COOPERATION: ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS
(Ctr. for Cooperatives, Univ. of Cal. 1995) (1948); Frank Robotka, A Theory of Cooperation, 29
J. FARM ECON. 94, 94–114 (1947); Richard Phillips, Economic Nature of the Cooperative Associ-
ation, 35 J. FARM ECON. 74, 74–98 (1953)).  Enke, and then Helmberger and Hoos, saw the
cooperative as a firm. Id. at 5 nn.7 & 8 (citing Stephen Enke, Consumer Cooperatives and Eco-
nomic Efficiency, 35 AM. ECON. REV.148, 148–155 (1945); Peter Helmberger & Sidney Hoos,
Cooperative Enterprise and Organization Theory, 44 J. FARM ECON. 275, 275–90 (1962)).  Addi-
tionally, another theory, known as the “cooperative as nexus of contracts” approach, concen-
trated on the nature of business relationships among the various cooperative stakeholders
through explicit and implicit contracts between them. Id. at 5 & n.10 (citing John M. Staatz, The
Structural Characteristics of Farmer Cooperatives and Their Behavioral Consequences, in COOP-
ERATIVE THEORY: NEW APPROACHES, ACS SERVICE REPORT 18 (Jeffrey S. Royer ed., 1987)).
62. The transaction cost theory of the firm was developed by Nobel Prize winning economist
Ronald Coase. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 16, 386–405 (1937); R.
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 15–19 (1960).
63. Vlanetinov, supra note 50, at 6 (quoting Holger Bonus, The Cooperative Association as a R
Business Enterprise, 142 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 310, 335 (1986)).
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 10; see also About Social Capital, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://www.hks.harvard
.edu/programs/saguaro/about-social-capital (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
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eral well-being of the members of the cooperative, the cooperative
could not function democratically in a sufficiently efficient manner to
be successful.  As succinctly stated by Professor Frank Groves of the
University of Wisconsin’s Center for Cooperatives, “Cooperatives
that forget their social responsibility are doomed to failure.”66
The fundamental economic relationship established by a coopera-
tive is distinct from that of an IOF in that they are “designed to serve
the needs of members rather than general profits for investors.”67  As
a cooperative grows, however, it faces the challenge of remaining re-
sponsive to its members, as opposed to following the interest of the
cooperative itself as a separate entity.  According to one commenta-
tor, there is a danger that the cooperative members can become “the
‘residual’ claimant [of the cooperative,] in the sense of crumbs left
over after all other agent groups receive their due.”68  In effect, when
the cooperative ceases to abide by its member-centered focus and
dual mission, it loses part of its inherent value.  If a cooperative is to
be viewed as a social enterprise, it needs to consider the manner in
which economics and structure can cause it to lose its member-service
focus.
C. The Cooperatives as Legal Construct
Finally, the cooperative form is not just a social movement or an
economic arrangement—in many cases, it is defined in the law for a
variety of purposes, including classification as a specific type of state
law entity.  These definitions grow out of the common historical un-
derstanding of the cooperative as it developed in the United States,
primarily as a form of agricultural association.  Accordingly, each defi-
nition contains at least some the primary touchstones of the coopera-
tive as established under the Rochdale Principles: democracy,
equality, common mission for the betterment of members, and divi-
sion of profits on the basis of use, not capital.
1. The Capper–Volstead Definition of a Cooperative
Part of the legal rationale for special treatment of the cooperative
as a separate legal entity is to address antitrust liability concerns.  At
first glance, many cooperatives, especially a producer cooperative,
66. See Frank Groves, The Philosophy of Cooperation and It’s Relationship to Cooperative
Structure and Operations (Oct. 1985) (Univ. of Wis. Ctr. for Coop Occasional Paper No. 6), http:/
/www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/ocpap/groves.html.
67. Vlanetinov, supra note 50, at 5. R
68. Torgerson et al., supra note 51. R
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would violate antitrust laws.69  By definition, a cooperative is a place
where various producers of goods gather with the intention to market
their products collectively in order to obtain better prices.  After all,
under Aaron Sapiro’s vision of the cooperative, a cooperative should
not even exist unless it can control a sufficient market share to dictate
pricing.70
In 1922, Congress enacted a specific exception from the Clayton
Act of 1914.  This exception is found in section 1 of the Cap-
per–Volstead Act,71 which specifically states,
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farm-
ers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act to-
gether in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without
capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for market, han-
dling, and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such prod-
ucts of persons so engaged.72
By its terms, the Capper–Volstead definition only applies to coopera-
tives that have agricultural producers as members and that engage
only in the collective processing and marketing of these agricultural
products in interstate or foreign commerce.73  In addition, a coopera-
tive that qualifies for the Capper–Volstead exemption must (1) be op-
erated for the mutual benefit of the members, (2) not grant a member
more than one vote in governance matters due to stock ownership or
capital contributions, (3) not pay dividends on stock in excess of eight
percent annually, and (4) not deal in the products of non-members in
an amount in excess of the value handled for members.74  Thus, the
antitrust exemptions of the Capper–Volstead Act are extremely
limited.
Importantly to the non-agriculture cooperative, the Cap-
per–Volstead Act reaffirms some of the basic tenants of cooperative
69. In its original format, the Sherman Act appeared to cover cooperatives.  Christine A. Var-
ney, The Capper-Volstead Act, Agricultural Cooperatives, and Antitrust Immunity, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Dec. 2010, at 1–2, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_
source/Dec10_Varney12_21.authcheckdam.pdf.  In 1914, the Clayton Act was amended to ex-
empt nonprofit, non-stock cooperatives, but it was not until the passage of Capper–Volstead Act
that it was clear that for-profit or stock-issuing cooperatives were also exempt. Id. at 2.
70. See Sapiro, supra note 54, at 87–88 (explaining that when a cooperative association is R
started, the cooperative must establish a minimum delivery amount from each member so as to
have a set amount of the commodity to go to market because a cooperative is ineffective until
the total set amount is reached).
71. Donald M. Barnes & Christophe E. Ondeck, The Capper-Volstead Act: Opportunity To-
day and Tomorrow, U. WIS. CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES (Aug. 5, 1997), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/
info/capper.html (detailing the history of the Capper–Volstead Act); Varney, supra note 69. R
72. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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organization originally enshrined in the Rochdale Principles: It re-
quires a cooperative to act for the mutual benefit of its members first
and foremost;75 to run on a one-member, one-vote principle; and to
significantly limit the payment of dividends on capital.76
2. Federal Income Taxation of Cooperatives
The Internal Revenue Code has its own definition of a coopera-
tive.77  As a for-profit entity, a cooperative could be taxed under the
three most common business entity regimes: C corporation, S corpora-
tion, or partnership.  Unknown to many, however, there is a fourth
business tax regime specifically for cooperatives buried in Subchapter
T of the Code.78  In addition, some cooperatives can qualify for tax-
exempt status as a farmers’ cooperative under § 52179 or under certain
specialized sections of § 501.80
a. Choice of Entity
Historically, a cooperative was organized as a corporation for state
law purposes; as a result, the Code originally initially taxed a coopera-
tive as a C corporation.81  Any cooperative formed in a state in which
it is required to be a corporation, the cooperative is classified as a
corporation for federal tax purposes.82  In the absence of special coop-
erative provisions, cooperative corporations was taxed as C corpora-
tions.83  In those states that have adopted Next Generation
Cooperative statutes,84 a cooperative is not automatically a corpora-
75. ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 24. R
76. Id.; see also BAARDA, supra 46, at 151. R
77. I.R.C. § 1381 (2012).
78. See infra Section II.C.2.b.
79. I.R.C. § 521 (2012).
80. Section 501(a) exempts organizations described in § 501(c) from the federal income tax,
including organizations described in § 501(c)(12) (cooperative telephone and electric compa-
nies); § 501(c)(14) (certain cooperative banks); and § 501(c)(16) (famers’ cooperative crop fi-
nancing organizations).
81. For further discussion, see infra Section II.C.3.a.  Under § 7701, a corporation for tax pur-
poses is “a business entity organized under a Federal or State statute, or under a statute of a
federally recognized Indian tribe, if the statute describes or refers to the entity as incorporated
or as a corporation, body corporate, or body politic.”  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (2016).
82. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a).
83. A cooperative corporation conceivably might qualify for S corporation status if it could
meet the requirements for such classification, although the one-class-of-stock rule of § 1361-
1(b)(1)(iv) might prove troublesome. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l) (2016).
84. Next Generation Cooperatives are discussed more fully infra Section II.C.3.b.
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tion for state law purposes and, therefore, it is not automatically con-
sidered a corporation for federal income tax classification purposes.85
b. Subchapter T
Subchapter T86 applies to “corporation[s] operating on a coopera-
tive basis,” subject to specific exemptions.87  A cooperative corpora-
tion under Subchapter T is also subject to the corporate income tax
under § 11.88  Thus, Subchapter T starts with the proposition that a
qualifying cooperative is taxed as a C corporation, except as otherwise
provided.
In order to benefit from taxation under Subchapter T, a cooperative
must be “operating on a cooperative basis.”89  The Treasury Regula-
tions state that Subchapter T applies “to any corporation operating on
a cooperative basis and allocating amounts to patrons on the basis of
the business done with or for such patrons.”90  In Puget Sound Ply-
wood v. Commissioner,91 the Tax Court explicitly references the
Rochdale Pioneers92 when crafting a definition of the term “operating
on a cooperative basis” under the prior version of this Regulation.
The Tax Court cites to at least three of the Rochdale Principles that
“persist as the core of economic cooperative theory”: subordination of
85. Wyoming’s Next Generation Cooperative statute, for example, was designed to allow a
cooperative to form as a limited liability company (LLC) in order to obtain pass-through taxa-
tion.  Such a cooperative would not be eligible for Subchapter T taxation. See DONALD A.
FREDERICK, U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE, INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF COOPERATIVES: BACK-
GROUND 8–9, (2005), https://www.rd.usda.gov/files/cir44-4.pdf.
86. I.R.C. § 1381(a).  In addition, Subchapter T applies to farmers’ cooperatives exempt under
§ 521. See I.R.C. § 1381(b).  Farmers’ cooperatives receive special tax treatment under § 521 and
Subchapter T. See I.R.C. § 521 (2012).  Although § 521 says, ostensibly, that farmers’ coopera-
tives are exempt from tax, § 1381(b) states that a § 521 farmers’ cooperative is actually subject to
the taxes as if it were a C corporation. See I.R.C. § 1381(b).  In addition, § 521 farmers’ coopera-
tives can deduct any dividends paid, as well as certain patronage distributions made, during the
year. See I.R.C. § 1362(c) (2012).
87. These exemptions include cooperatives that are otherwise exempt from tax, certain mu-
tual savings banks and insurance companies, and cooperative electric and telephone companies.
I.R.C. § 1381(a)(2).
88. Id. § 1381(b).  In addition, the corporate alternative minimum tax of § 1201 applies to
Subchapter T cooperatives. See id.
89. Id.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.381-1 (2016).  Prior to the enactment of Subchapter T in 1962, the taxation
of non-exempt cooperatives was governed by § 522 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
was at issue in Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305, 305–06 (1965). Puget
Sound cites to Treasury Regulation section 1.522-1(b)(1), which is the precursor to current Trea-
sury Regulation section 1.1381-1.  The old Treasury Regulation states “the term cooperative as-
sociation includes any corporation operating on a cooperative basis and allocating amounts to
patrons on the basis of the business done with or for such patrons.”  Treas. Reg. §1.522-1(b)(1).
91. Puget Sound Plywood, 44 T.C. 305.
92. Id. at 307.
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capital, democratic control, and allocation on the basis of use.93  As a
result, Puget Sound Plywood requires a cooperative to satisfy the fol-
lowing requirements: (1) Allocation of patronage distributions based
on a legal obligation; (2) Allocations must be made out of income
from transactions with its patrons; and (3) Allocations must be equita-
bly made.94
Assuming that an organization meets the definition of a cooperative
under Subchapter T, it is subject to different treatment under Sub-
chapter T based on the nature of the patronage dividends allocated to
members. C corporations normally distribute corporate earnings “to
shareholders on a basis having some relationship to the number or
value of shares owned.”95  One of the traditional cooperative princi-
ples, however, is that distributions should not be based on capital
ownership, but rather on some measure of the member’s use of the
cooperative.96  To the extent that the taxation of C corporation distri-
butions is based on a pro rata relationship to equity, that taxation
structure is inappropriate in a cooperative context.97
Subchapter T recognizes the unique relationship between the coop-
erative and its patrons, employing a different standard for defining
income for cooperative members.  In so doing, even the Tax Code rec-
ognizes the importance of the Rochdale Principles in defining the out-
lines of cooperative business organizations.
93. Id. at 308.
94. Id. at 322 (citing United States v. Miss. Chem. Co., 326 F.2d 569, 573–74 (5th Cir. 1964);
Pomeroy Coop. Grain Co. v. Comm’r, 288 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir. 1961)).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(iii) (2016).
96. A. Richard Kimbrough, Report of Special Committee on Cooperatives, 22 TAX LAW. 754,
754–55 (1969).
97. The hallmark of the C corporation is the denial of a deduction for dividends paid when
calculating gross income.  The dividends are also taxed in the hands of the shareholders, result-
ing in the much-maligned “double tax” regime inherent in C corporation taxation.  John N. Ev-
ans & Maria L. Castilla, Despite Higher Rates, S Corporations Retain Advantages over C
Corporations, 91 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 271, 272 (2013) (explaining the disadvantages of
double taxation); cf. I.R.C. § 243 (2012) (explaining that dividends received by a parent corpora-
tion from a controlled domestic corporation are entirely tax free under I.R.C. § 243).  In lieu of
the double tax regime of Subchapter C, Subchapter T sets up a pass-through entity regime spe-
cifically applicable only to qualified cooperatives.  Essentially, the entity is allowed a deduction
for amounts paid to patrons, but its patrons include the amounts received in income.  A coopera-
tive’s gross income is defined without any adjustment for any allocation or distribution to a
patron of the net earnings of the cooperative, subject to certain exceptions for patronage divi-
dends and certain retained allocations of revenue. See I.R.C. § 1382(b) (2012).  This clarifies
that these items are included in the gross income in the cooperative and then deducted, while
retained earnings are deducted from gross income.  These cooperative distributions are typically
included in the income of the recipient patrons. See I.R.C. § 1385(a) (2012).
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3. State Law Entity Definitions of Cooperatives
Every state has some type of cooperative enabling statute; some
states have multiple statutes depending upon the type of coopera-
tive.98  “The nonuniform development of agricultural co-ops and co-
operative law has resulted in significant variations in state cooperative
statutes—many of which were enacted from 1910 to 1925.  In fact, few
states have the same cooperative statute.”99  Despite this patchwork
development of state law, there are some common themes to coopera-
tive enabling statutes that stem from their historical relationship with
agricultural development, dating back to the first cooperatives in the
United States that were based on the Rochdale model.
Under some state statutes, a cooperative is a separate entity; how-
ever, under other statutes, a cooperative is a “flavor” of corpora-
tion.100  In West Virginia, for example, a cooperative is incorporated
under the Cooperative Association Act, but is then governed by the
Business Corporation,101  Benefit Corporation,102 or Nonprofit Cor-
poration Acts to the extent the Cooperative Association Act is si-
lent.103  For those corporations that elected to be treated as
cooperative associations, the cooperative statute then limits the pur-
poses and powers of the corporation in order to fulfill its cooperative
purpose of service to members.104
a. Early Cooperative Law and the Standard Act
One commentator points to the Michigan statute in 1865 as the first
cooperative law.105  Massachusetts passed its cooperative enabling leg-
islation in 1866, which allowed for the incorporation of agricultural
cooperatives.106  A number of states followed the Massachusetts
98. BAARDA, supra note 46, at 103.  “All states have recognized cooperatives’ special charac- R
teristics by enacting statutes specifically designed for incorporating cooperatives.  The 50 States
have approximately 85 such statutes” as of the time of Baarda’s article. Id.
99. Mark J. Hanson, Legal Framework of Cooperative Development, in COOPERATIVES AND
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95, 107 (Christo-
pher D. Merrett & Norman Walzer eds., 2004).
100. See UNIF. LTD. COOP. ASS’N ACT comment to Section 101 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2008), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20co
operative%20association/ulcaa_final_07.pdf (The title of this Act indicates a limited cooperative
association is a type of cooperative different from cooperatives modeled on a corporate form).
101. Business Corporation Act, W. VA. CODE § 31D-3-301 (2014).
102. Benefit Corporation Act, W. VA. CODE § 31F-3-301 (2014).
103. Nonprofit Corporation Act, W. VA. CODE § 31E-3-301 (2014).
104. W. VA. CODE § 19-4-1 to -29 (2015) (regarding Cooperative Associations).
105. See BAARDA, supra note 46, at 107. R
106. CHARLES T. AUTRY & RONALD F. HALL, THE LAW OF COOPERATIVES 15 (2009).
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model, such that there were at least ten states with cooperative incor-
poration statutes by the turn of the century.107
The cooperative economist Aaron Sapiro108 supported his concept
of a product-centered, monopolistic agricultural marketing coopera-
tive by drafting the Standard Marketing Act (widely known as the
“Standard Act”),109 which was adopted in a number of jurisdictions
during the early 1920s.110  For example, the Bingham Act in Kentucky
is widely identified as an example of the Standard Act as actually en-
acted by a state legislature.111  According to James Baarda of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, forty-six different states had adopted
some variation of the Standard Act by 1930.112
Sapiro’s Standard Act was specifically designed to coordinate with
the requirements of the Capper–Volstead Act.113  Much like the Cap-
per–Volstead Act itself, the Standard Act is limited to agricultural co-
operatives114 and adopts three of the Rochdale Principles, which are
incorporated into the Capper–Volstead Act: organization for the mu-
tual benefit of the members; one member, one vote; and dividends on
the basis of use and not capital.115  Early statutes that may have incor-
porated some cooperative values into the structure of the entity, how-
ever, were rapidly replaced or augmented by the Standard Act.116
107. Id. at 15.  This includes Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Michigan, California, and New Jersey.
Id.  The Massachusetts model allowed for capital stock but did not place any restrictions on
voting rights or distributions. Id.
108. See Roger G. Ginder, Aaron Sapiro Theory of Cooperatives: A Contemporary Assess-
ment, J. AGRIC. COOPERATION 93, 99 (1993).
109. BAARDA, supra note 46, at 109. R
110. See Amy M. Nagler et al., Institutions and Agricultural Cooperatives in Wyoming 16
(Univ. of Wis. Ctr. for Cooperatives Staff Paper No. 4, 2004), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/pdf/
staff%20papers/staff04.pdf.  Baarda states that these jurisdictions included Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Carolina, Texas, Washington, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Virginia, California,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming, New Jersey, New York, Indiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, and Rhode Island. BAARDA, supra note 46, at 110 nn.126–31. R
111. BAARDA, supra note 46, at 109; NAGLER ET AL., supra note 110, at 16. R
112. BAARDA, supra note 46, at 110. R
113. NAGLER ET AL., supra note 110, at 16. R
114. Id.
115. Harlan Huntley, Historical Study of Wisconsin Cooperative Statutes, 1954 WIS. L. REV.
571, 576 (1954).
116. Based on the success of the Standard Act, the National Conference of Commissioners for
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) tried to introduce a “Uniform Agricultural Cooperative Associ-
ation Act” in 1936 but it was only adopted in three states and was eventually withdrawn.
BAARDA, supra note 46, at 110–11. R
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Over time, the states updated the Standard Act to expand the use of
cooperatives.117  Wisconsin is a good example of a state law innovator
in cooperative law.  In 1911, Wisconsin allowed cooperatives to func-
tion in sectors beyond agriculture.118  The Wisconsin law allowed five
persons to “associate” (as a cooperative) in the fields of dairy, mer-
cantile, mining, and manufacturing;119 however, it continued to treat
the cooperative as a “flavor” of corporation.120  In 1921, as a result of
a conference between representatives of the farm organizations and
members of the Wisconsin Division of Markets, Wisconsin made some
key revisions to its statute, including clarifying stock and nonstock as-
sociations and defining membership, voting rights, and new rules on
earnings apportionment.121  The Wisconsin law was generally adopted
by sixteen states in the following eight years.122
b. Next Generation Cooperatives123
One of the fundamental obstacles to the growth of cooperatives in
the United States (and elsewhere) is the need for capital.124  The co-
operative’s primary mission to serve its members can hinder its ability
to raise capital.  If equity ownership in the cooperative is legally lim-
ited to its members, then using equity to raise capital is only possible if
the individual members have capital to contribute.  For a cooperative
that is focused on addressing the needs of members who may be so-
cially or economically disadvantaged, it seems unlikely that the indi-
vidual members could provide sufficient funding to start a capital-
intensive business.
117. Diane Rizzuto Suhler & Michael L. Cook, Origins of a Current Conflict? An Examina-
tion of Stock-Nonstock Cooperative Law, 8 J. COOPERATIVES 54, 57 (1993) (“The basic provi-
sions of these laws mirrored the Rochdale Principles.  Some of the common provisions included:
cooperatives could issue shares but could limit the number of shares held by each member;
voting was on the basis of members, not shares; each member had one vote; the basis of distrib-
uting earnings was established by individual cooperatives.”); see also Huntley, supra note 115, at R
571–72.
118. 20 GEORGE HAROLD POWELL, COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE 45 (1913).
119. Id.
120. See Huntley, supra note 115, at 575. R
121. Suhler & Cook, supra note 117, at 60. R
122. BAARDA, supra note 46, at 107–08 & n.113 (citing NOURSE, THE LEGAL STATUS OF R
FARMER COOPERATION 46 n.23 (1927)) (indicating Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, New
York, Kansas, Washington, Massachusetts, Virginia, Iowa, Wyoming, North Carolina, South Car-
olina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Kentucky, and Oklahoma and later, Nebraska, Colorado, Indiana,
North Dakota, and Florida adopted the Wisconsin law).
123. These cooperatives are also referred to as “new generation,” “new age,” or “value
added” cooperatives. See ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 22; see also AUTRY & HALL, supra R
note 106, at 20–22; BAARDA, supra note 46, at 110 (including Wyoming, Minnesota, and R
Tennessee).
124. ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 22, at 4. R
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In order to address difficulties experienced by traditional coopera-
tives in raising capital, some states have adopted “Next Generation
Cooperative” (NGC) legislation.125  In 1999, a group of Wyoming
lamb farmers wanted to process “value-added product”126—for exam-
ple, breaking down the lamb in to marketable cuts and processing
pelts.127  This plan required a significant capital expenditure, which
appeared to be unavailable through loans or additional membership
capital.128  In 2001, the lamb producers successfully obtained a change
to Wyoming’s cooperative enabling statute,129 which now allows for
investment and management by non-member-patrons.130  Minnesota
followed in 2003,131 with others coming soon thereafter.132
In an effort to address the problem of raising capital that haunts the
traditional cooperative, NGCs generally allow for some type of capital
investments by non-members.133  Some percentage of the coopera-
tive’s annual profit must be reserved for patron-member134 distribu-
tions.  Wyoming’s statute requires a cooperative to allocate at least
fifteen percent of its annual profits to patron-members,135 while Min-
125. Id. at 22.
126. Shermain D. Hardesty, New State Statutes Allow Nonmember Equity Capital for Cooper-
atives, U. CAL.IFORNIA SMALL FARM PROGRAM, http://sfp.ucdavis.edu/cooperatives/Reports/wy-
oming/ (last updated May 22, 2012).
127. See Sue Rosler, Lamb Producer Cooperative Purchases Processing Plant, FARM &
RANCH GUIDE (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.farmandranchguide.com/news/livestock/lamb-pro-
ducer-cooperative-purchases-processing-plant/article_49911d02-a04c-11e5-8e30-67576aafc859
.html.
128. As more cooperatives try to vertically integrate the processing, marketing, and delivery
of their product, this capital issue repeatedly arises.  Hanson, supra note 99, at 12. R
129. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-10-201 to -253. (2013).
130. Id.; see Hardesty, supra note 126; see also NAGLER ET AL., supra note 110, at 22–23. R
131. Hardesty, supra note 126; see MINN. STAT. §§ 308B.001–.975 (2016). R
132. The Prefatory Note to the ULCAA drafted in 2007, discussed in Section I.C.3.d., specifi-
cally examined the next generation cooperative statutory provisions of Wyoming (WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17-10-201 to -253), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 308B.001–.975), Tennessee (TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 43-38-101 to -1109 (2014)), Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 501A.101–.1216 (2016)),
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 193.001–.971 (2016)), and Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-
2901 to -29,134 (2015)).
133. “This may range from preferred stock with no rights to vote on the one hand to actual
non-patronage membership and representation on the board of directors on the other.”
BAARDA, supra note 46, at ii. R
134. For purposes of discussions of NGCs in this article, the term “patron-member” refers to
an owner of a cooperative that is also part of the class of persons that the cooperative was
formed to serve.  In this context, the term “member” is no longer adequate to describe this set of
individuals as an investor can now be a member of the cooperative and because under NGCs, a
cooperative can be in limited liability company form.
135. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-10-233.  Tennessee’s statute contains the same requirement.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-38-901.
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nesota’s default rule is that fifty percent of the annual profits must be
reserved to patron-members.136
In a traditional cooperative, the cooperative is not only owned but
also exclusively managed by its member-patrons.137  In the NGC, the
investors may participate in the management of the cooperative al-
though there is a usually a minimum threshold for member-patrons
voting.  For example, in Minnesota and Iowa, the cooperative’s gov-
erning documents may not reduce the vote of the member-patrons to
below fifteen percent of total voting power,138 while Wisconsin’s NCG
statute appears to require member-patrons to have not less than fifty-
one percent of the total vote collectively.139
The provisions of NGC enabling statutes that allow non-members
to both own equity and participate in management clearly runs afoul
of more traditional, Rochdale-inspired notions of the cooperative bus-
iness model.  Traditional cooperatives avoided the inevitable tension
that would arise between cooperative member-owners and profit-ori-
ented investors by simply not having investors other than members.
By reintroducing an investor class into the cooperative, this funda-
mental tension reappears.
In order to resolve this tension as a legal matter, it must be deter-
mined whether the governing body of an NGC owes a duty of care to
all of the members, the patrons-members, or some other subset of
stakeholders in the cooperative.  Does the presence of investors in a
NGC (especially a NGC in business corporation form) now mean that
the traditional for-profit fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profit
applies?  If it does apply, is it tempered in whole or in part by the
cooperative’s duty to further the interests of its patron-members?
The Wyoming Processing Cooperative statute is silent on the mat-
ter; the Minnesota statue provides the director must act “in a manner
the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the coop-
erative.”140 While the Minnesota’s provision resembles the standard
136. That amount can be lowered to as little as fifteen percent if the cooperative’s governing
documents or a vote of the patron-members so provides. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 308B.721; see
also IOWA CODE ANN. § 501A.1005; NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2980.  Wisconsin provides for a fifty-
one percent default rule for patron-members, which may be lowered to thirty percent. WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 193.601(4).
137. See History of the Co-operative Movement, supra note 23. R
138. Generally, the member-patrons and the investors vote as separate blocks and/or classes.
Additionally, the governing body of the cooperative must have representatives who are elected
by the member-patrons. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 501A.810; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 308B.545(1).
139. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 193.545.
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 308B.455(1); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 501A.712; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2970(1)(c); TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-38-616.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL404.txt unknown Seq: 24 20-SEP-17 14:54
1036 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1013
formulation of the duty of care for most for-profit corporations,141 the
Wisconsin NGC statute takes a different approach.  The Wisconsin
statute starts with the same formula of the duty of care reflected in
Minnesota and Iowa’s legislation, but then provides as follows:
(b) In discharging his or her duties to the cooperative and in deter-
mining what he or she believes to be in the best interests of the
cooperative, a director may consider any of the following:
1. The effects of the action on employees, suppliers, creditors,
and customers of the cooperative.
2. The effects of the action on communities in which the coop-
erative operates.
3. The effects of the action on members and stockholders.
4. The economy of this state.
5. The long-term and short-term interests of the cooperative
and its patron members, including the possibility that these in-
terests may be best served by the continued independence of
the cooperative.
6. Any other factors the director considers pertinent.142
In this regard, the Wisconsin’s duty of care for cooperatives parallels
traditional corporate constituency statutes.143
Constituency statutes purport to amend a corporate board of direc-
tors’ traditional fiduciary duty of care to maximize shareholder
value.144  Typically, courts will invoke the business judgment rule to
give rise to a rebuttable presumption that a board’s decisions are in
the best interests of the corporation, so long as those decisions are
informed, reasonable, and in good faith.145  This grants boards some
latitude of discretion in making decisions.146  In the everyday adminis-
tration context, a board could probably consider non-profit maximiza-
tion factors so long as the action was in the best interests of the
company overall, although the extent of that discretion has never been
clear.147  In the context of a takeover, however, the board is much
141. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 308B.455.
142. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 193.455(1)(b).
143. Compare, for example, Illinois’ constituency statute, which states “In discharging the du-
ties of their respective positions, the [governing body] may, in considering the best interests of
the corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers, and customers of
the corporation, communities in which officers or other establishments of the corporation are
located and all other pertinent factors.”  805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 32/8.85 (2014).
144. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 971, 976 (1992) (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)); see also
Richard B. Tyler, Other Constituency Statues, 59 MO. L. REV. 373, 375 (1994); Nathan E. Stand-
ley, Note, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the Constituency Statutes, 4 ELON L. REV.
209, 219 (2012).
145. Bainbridge, supra note 144, at 977. R
146. Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency States Protect So-
cially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 787 (2009).
147. Bainbridge, supra note 144, at 976. R
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more constrained.  In 1986, the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndres & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,148 held that the board has
a duty to pursue the highest possible price per share and cannot sacri-
fice shareholder value for other considerations.149 Revlon “sharply
limits directors’ ability to consider non-shareholder interests”150 in the
takeover or similar structural change contexts.151
In order to allow governing bodies to consider factors other than
price per share (such as the effects on the community or employees),
many states enacted so-called “constituency statutes.”  The first such
statute was passed in 1983 by Pennsylvania,152 with a majority of states
following thereafter.153  Generally, a constituency statute amends the
directors’ traditional duty of care154 to allow (but not require)155 the
board to consider the interests of corporate stakeholders other than
just the shareholders when determining whether an action is in the
best interest of the corporation.156  This typically allowed a director to
consider the interest of employees, the community, and other perti-
nent interests.
In its NGC statute, Wisconsin adapted the traditional corporate
constituency statute to cooperative use.  The NGC statute clearly rec-
ognizes that members, stockholders, and patrons are different stake-
148. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
149. Bisconti, supra note 146, at 779–80. R
150. In Revlon, the board took into consideration the interests of certain debt holders when
deciding to accept a bid that offered a lower price per share to the shareholders. Revlon, 506
A.2d at 177–78.
151. Bainbridge, supra note 144, at 983. R
152. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 515(a) (2016).  The statute reads as follows:
(a) General rule.  In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of
directors, committees of the board and individual directors of a domestic corporation
may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the extent they
deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action, includ-
ing shareholders, members, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corpo-
ration, and upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located.
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including benefits that
may accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these
interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
(3) The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential) of any person
seeking to acquire control of the corporation.
(4) All other pertinent factors.
Id. (emphasis added).
153. Bisconti, supra note 146, at 781. R
154. For an example of the corporate duty of care, see REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORA-
TION ACT § 8.30(a) (1984).
155. Except Connecticut, which is mandatory. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(e) (2016).
156. Bainbridge, supra note 144, at 986. R
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holders in the cooperative organization, with potentially different
interests.157  The statute further allows for the consideration of the
needs of employees or customers, who may also be patrons of the co-
operative.158  Finally, the statute permits a board to consider the needs
of its immediate community and the state, emphasizing the ability of
the cooperative to consider public impacts in a manner consistent with
the ICA’s cooperative principle of “concern for community.”159
The structure of these NGCs raises the issue of whether cooperative
law has strayed too far from its principled beginnings.  “Sharing coop-
erative control may sooner or later undermine the strengths of coop-
eratives as sole representatives”160 of the interests of the members.
“Conflicts in motivations and objectives between those who wish to
benefit from use and those who wish to benefit from returns on invest-
ment will make good governance difficult if not impossible.”161  In-
deed, the entire point of the traditional Rochdale cooperative was to
be responsive to the needs of members, even if those needs do not
involve or even run contrary to a profit motive.
While it is too early to tell, some in the cooperative community are
concerned that the interests of the members are no longer aligned
with the interests of this new class of cooperative capital.  “Some new
generation businesses appear to have adopted more of an ‘investor’
rather than ‘user’ culture.”162  In the case of the first generation of
NCGs, the danger is that cooperatives are drifting away from
Draheim’s “dual-natured” cooperative163 by so de-emphasizing the
social nature of the cooperative that the cooperative’s social capital164
is eroded to the point of inconsequence.  While Wisconsin’s constitu-
ency statute language may be helpful in this regard, its language is
merely permissive in nature and still requires the governing body to
act in the best interests of the cooperative as a whole.165
157. Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 193.455(1)(b)(3) (2016), with WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 193.455(1)(b)(5).
158. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 193.455(1)(b)(1).
159. Id. § 193.455(1)(b)(2), (4), (6); see supra Section II.A.3 (discussing the ICA principles).
160. BAARDA, supra note 46, at iii.
161. Id.
162. Torgerson et al., supra note 51; Bruce J. Reynolds & Thomas W. Gray, Evolution of R
Cooperative Thought, Theory, and Purpose, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN CENTER FOR COOPERATIVES,
http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/torg.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
163. See supra Part I.B.1.
164. See supra Part I.B.2.
165. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 193.455(b) (“in determining what he or she believes to be in the best
interest of the cooperative, a director may consider any of the following . . . .” (emphasis added)).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL404.txt unknown Seq: 27 20-SEP-17 14:54
2017] COOPERATIVES: THE FIRST SOCIAL ENTERPRISE1039
c. Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act166
In response to the growth of Next Generation Cooperatives, the
National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws (NC-
CUSL) made a second attempt at drafting uniform cooperative legis-
lation.167  In 2003, NCCUSL created a drafting committee to address
the possibility of developing a new cooperative law168 based upon the
efforts in Wyoming and Minnesota.169
The Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act (ULCAA),170
approved in 2007, “recognizes a growing trend toward the ‘New Gen-
eration Cooperative’ (NGC), which can include features not readily
available under traditional cooperative law.”171  As with other NGC
statutes, the ULCAA allows for cooperative ownership and manage-
ment by non-member investors.172  Unlike the first NGCs in Wyoming
and Iowa, however, the ULCAA makes great efforts to understand
and incorporate the social nature of the cooperative into the enabling
legislation to offset the potential issues raised by having a non-patron
investor class.  As a result, the UCLAA tries to minimize the damage
to the social side of the cooperative and establish the primacy of mem-
ber-patron interests even in the face of outside investors.
Cooperatives under the ULCAA do not necessarily “piggy back”
on to existing corporate statutes.  The ULCAA Drafting Committee
indicated that one of the primary influences on its definition of a co-
166. UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2007), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20cooperative%
20association/ulcaa_final_07.pdf.
167. For a discussion of NCUSSL’s first attempt, see UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSO-
CIATION ACT prefatory note at 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
2013).
168. The study committee’s early efforts focused solely on agricultural cooperatives, but in
2005 NCCUSL voted to expand the scope of the drafting committee’s charge to address non-
agricultural cooperatives as well. BAARDA, supra note 46, at 127. R
169. UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT prefatory note at 5 (NAT’L CON-
FERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2013).
170. See generally id.; Thomas Earl Geu & James B. Dean, The New Uniform Limited Cooper-
ative Association Act:  A Capital Idea for Principled Self-Help Value Added Firms, Community-
Based Economic Development, and Low-Profit Joint Ventures, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J.
55 (2009) (providing an extensive discussion of the ULCAA written by two NCCUSL reporters).
171. Why States Should Adopt ULCAA, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20ULCAA (last visited Jan. 14,
2017).
172. See UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT § 601 cmt. ¶ 2(c) (NAT’L CON-
FERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2013) (“This act does not prevent a limited cooper-
ative association from engaging in business or other activities with non-members.”).  As of 2016,
ULCAA has been adopted in Utah, Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont, and the District
of Columbia.
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operative was the federal income tax definition.173  As with the other
NGC statutes, the ULCAA allows for unincorporated cooperatives,
which would allow a cooperative to form as a LLC or partnership.174
A NGC formed as a LLC or partnership would qualify for pass-
through taxation rather than traditional C corporation taxation, mak-
ing qualification for the Subchapter T cooperative modifications un-
necessary.175  Because of the broad definitions and flexibility built into
the ULCAA, a cooperative that took full advantage of the non-mem-
ber ownership and management provisions of the ULCAA might not
qualify for antitrust exemption under the Capper–Volstead Act.176
While ULCAA cooperatives that are not concerned about Subchapter
T or the Capper–Volstead Act retain the operational flexibility, these
ULCAA cooperatives do not automatically adopt the Rochdale-type
values that are inherent in the definition of a cooperative for purposes
of the tax and antitrust laws.
In spite of the fact that the ULCAA veers away from the traditional
Rochdale Principles177 by allowing ownership, management and vot-
ing by non-patron investors, the Drafting Committee specifically
states that it sought to “provide an alternative which accounts for co-
operative principles to a greater extent, with less room for design
abuse . . . .”178  In its Prefatory Note, the Drafting Committee specifi-
cally listed the cooperative principles enumerated by the ICA as the
touchstone for cooperative organization.179
This adoption of the ICA’s restatement of traditional cooperative
values is evident in the ULCAA’s duty of care.  The ULCAA directs
cooperatives to look to its underlying applicable corporate statute for
the appropriate standard of conduct.180  This general direction, how-
ever, is specifically subject to the provisions of section 820 of the UL-
CAA, which states as follows:
173. UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT prefatory note at 2 (2007).
174. Id. at 1–5; see also id. § 101 cmt.
175. Subchapter T applies to farmers’ cooperatives exempt under § 521. See I.R.C. § 1381.
For more information on the C corporation and Subchapter T taxation, see supra Section II.C.2.
176. See UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT prefatory note at 6 (2007).
177. This is acknowledged by NCUSSL: “While New Generation cooperatives involve some
significant departures from traditional cooperative structure, they have been organized under
traditional cooperative statutes.” UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT prefa-
tory note at 5 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2007), http://www
.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20cooperative%20association/ulcaa_final_07.pdf.
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. at 4 (citing Gene Ingalsbe & Frank Groves, Historical Development, in COOPERA-
TIVES IN AGRICULTURE 106, 110–11 (David Cobia ed., 1989)).
180. UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT § 818.  This appears to be the case
even if even if the cooperative ultimately determines to remain unincorporated.
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Unless the articles of organization otherwise provide, in considering
the best interests of a limited cooperative association, a director of
the association in discharging the duties of director, in conjunction
with considering the long and short term interest of the association
and its patron members, may consider:
(1) the interest of employees, customers, and suppliers of the
association;
(2) the interest of the community in which the association operates;
and
(3) other cooperative principles and values that appropriately can
be applied in the context of the decision.181
Similar to the Wisconsin NGC statute,182 section 820 of the ULCAA
specifically allows the governing body of a cooperative to consider the
impact of its actions on constituencies other than its equity owners.
Both section 820 of the ULCAA and the Wisconsin statute allow the
governing body to take into consideration ICA cooperative principle
number 7, the impact on the community.  Unlike the Wisconsin stat-
ute, however, the ULCAA allows the cooperative to consider addi-
tional traditional cooperative principles and values, such as those
enumerated by the Rochdale Pioneers and the ICA.183
Section 820 of the ULCAA essentially acts as a cooperative constit-
uency statute, allowing the governing body of the cooperative to con-
sider factors other than maximization of value for the cooperative’s
equity holders.  The notes accompanying section 820 state that this
provisions allow the cooperative to be governed “in keeping with
traditional cooperative values and principles, e.g., community inter-
ests, interests of persons related to the cooperative, and other appro-
priate cooperative principles such as education . . . .”184  In keeping
with the flexible approach of the ULCAA, a cooperative with a heavy
investor focus could delete or limit the impact of section 820 in its
governing documents.  Adopting this language, however, would allow
the governing body of a NGC formed under the ULCAA to continue
to observe the social values inherent in a traditional Rochdale cooper-
ative,185 such as education and community betterment.186
The ULCAA offers the modern cooperative a choice of identity.
On the one hand, if the cooperative is primarily concerned with capi-
tal formation and issues of investment and return, it can fully avail
181. Id. § 820 (emphasis added).
182. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 193.455 (2016).
183. UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT § 820(3); see also supra Section
II.A.
184. UNIFORM LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT § 820 notes.
185. History of the Co-operative Movement, supra note 23. R
186. For discussion of the cooperative principles, see supra Section II.A.
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itself of the new features of NGC enabling statutes and elect not to
adopt the constituency provisions of the ULCAA’s duty of care.  Al-
ternatively, a cooperative can choose to follow the traditional path
that originated with the Rochdale Pioneers and was embodied in the
ICA standards and early cooperative enabling legislation.  This path
allows a traditional cooperative the flexibility not to have non-patron
members and to continue adhering to the democratic membership
voting.  Finally, a cooperative could draft the constituency statute
utilizing provisions of the ULCAA, which would allow it to continue
to emphasize the traditional cooperative values of community benefit,
education, concern for labor, and sustainability.
III. DOES THE COOPERATIVE HAVE A CHARITABLE PURPOSE?
As envisioned by the Rochdale Pioneers, a traditional cooperative
is not just another business enterprise.  Rather, the cooperative should
be an arrangement “for the pecuniary benefit, and improvement of
the social and domestic condition of its members . . . .”187  The ICA, in
adapting the Rochdale Principles to the modern cooperative move-
ment, stresses social responsibility, opportunity, education, and joint
cultural needs.  If one views cooperatives as a social movement, there
are clearly values and activities inherent in that movement that would
be charitable in nature, even if those values and activities exist in con-
cert with a desire for pecuniary gain among the cooperative’s
members.
A. Section 501(c)(3)’s Definition of Charitable
Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from federal
income taxation those organizations described in § 501(c).188  Most
notably, § 501(c)(3) describes organizations that are organized and
operated exclusively for charitable, educational, and similar
purposes.189
The Treasury Regulations define the term “charitable” for
§ 501(c)(3) purposes by incorporating the general understanding of
charity as developed under the common law.190  The Regulations also
enumerate specific purposes that fall within the definition of charita-
187. The Pioneers’ Rule Book 1844, supra note 28. R
188. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012).
189. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  This section specifically exempts organizations that are “religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster na-
tional or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals . . . .” Id.
190. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2016).
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ble, including the “relief of the poor and distressed or of the under-
privileged . . . [and the] promotion of social welfare by organizations
designed . . . to combat community deterioration and juvenile delin-
quency.”191  Similarly, the Treasury Regulations define the term “edu-
cational” for § 501(c)(3) purposes to include “[t]he instruction or
training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing
his capabilities . . . .”192
The statutory language of § 501(c)(3) requires an exempt organiza-
tion to be both organized and operated exclusively to further its enu-
merated charitable and educational purposes.193  Under the
Regulations, an organization is “not organized or operated exclusively
for one or more of the [tax-exempt purposes] . . . unless it serves a
public rather than a private interest.”194  “Exclusively” for these pur-
poses does not necessarily mean that no private benefit exists; rather,
[a]n organization will be regard as operated exclusively for one or
more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities
which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes . . . [a]n
organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial
part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.195
That being said, private individuals frequently benefit from charitable
organizations—one need look no further than a scholarship recipient
or an individual receiving disaster relief funds.196  In these circum-
stances, the organization accomplishes its charitable mission by bene-
fitting individual recipients; the recipients are the “instruments”
through which the charity acts.197  Accordingly, providing benefits to a
191. Id.; see also Matthew J. Rossman, Evaluating Trickle Down Charity: A Solution for De-
termining When Economic Development Aimed at Revitalizing America’s Cities and Regions Is
Really Charitable, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1455, (2014).  The Regulations specifically state, “Such
term includes: Relief of the poor and distressed . . . .”  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).  As a
technical matter, the charitable purposes that are enumerated in the regulations should only be
examples, and not the exclusive definition of charity.  In practice, the IRS and courts tend to
frame arguments about the definition of “charitable” around the enumerated purposes in the
Regulation, even if a particular item could fall within the “broad outlines of charity as developed
by judicial decisions.” Id.
192. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(a).
193. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
195. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). Id.; see also Ky. Bar Found. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 921,
923 (1982) (citing Church in Boston v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 102, 107 (1978)) (“‘[E]xclusively’ is
given a connotation different from its ordinary meaning.  It does not mean ‘solely’ or ‘absolutely
without exception.’”); Rossman, supra note 191, at 1474. R
196. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1074 (1989) (“[The IRS] recognizes that
an educational organization exists to confer primary private benefits by instructing or training
individuals for the purpose of improving or developing his or her capabilities.”).
197. Aid to Artisans v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 202, 214 (noting that the charity’s activities of import
and sale of handcrafted goods “are not an end unto themselves, but rather undertaken in order
to accomplish certain exempt purposes”); see also Rev. Rule 72-559, 1972-2 C.B. 247.
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charitable class of individuals is not a prohibited private benefit so
long as the benefit specifically furthers the organization’s tax-exempt
purpose.198  This includes the provision of private benefits to such in-
dividuals when they are “focused on furthering a particular targeted
private interest” such that the “secondary benefit ceases to be
incidental.”199
Such private benefits are incidental and collateral to the charity’s
tax-exempt activities200 if a two-part test is met: (1) the benefit is a
qualitatively incidental because it is a necessary result of the charita-
ble activity, and (2) the benefit is quantitatively incidental because it is
insubstantial in comparison to the charitable benefit to the public.201
In many instances, an organization that loses its tax-exempt status
due to private benefit issues may be engaging in otherwise charitable
behavior.  An organization may undertake charitable activities, but
because of the existence of non-incidental private benefit, the charity
no longer meets the “organized and operated exclusively” test.  In
American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner,202 the IRS conceded
that the organization was actually running a school that trained indi-
viduals in political fieldwork that would have been “educational” for
§ 501(c)(3) purposes, but for the substantial private benefit running to
the Academy’s organizers (the Republican party).203  The Tax Court
in American Campaign Academy204 noted, “The presence of a single
198. Aid to Artisans, 71 T.C. at 213 (examining a charity that purchased handmade items from
disadvantaged artists through an artist cooperative); see also Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at
1076; Ky. Bar Found., 78 T.C. at 926.
199. Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1074.
200. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283–84 (1945); see
Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1061–62; Columbia Park & Recreation Ass’n v. Comm’r, 88
T.C. 1, 18 (1987), aff’d, 838 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see also Rossman, supra note
191, at 1459. R
201. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991); Rossman, supra note 191, at 1475.  For a R
critique of the private benefit doctrine, see generally John D. Colombo, In Search of Private
Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063 (2006) [hereinafter In Search]; John D. Colombo, Private Benefit,
Joint Ventures and the Death of Healthcare as an Exempt Purpose, 34 J. HEALTH L. 505 (2001).
202. 92 T.C. 1053 (concerning a school that otherwise provided educational benefits to stu-
dents was denied tax-exempt status due to a “secondary” private benefit to the school’s or-
ganizers, the Republican Party).
203. Id. at 1056; see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii) (2016), ex.1 & 3 (exempting trade
schools and correspondence courses, respectively); see also Rev. Rul. 2006-27; Colombo, In
Search, supra note 201, at 1074. R
204. Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1065 (citing Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 US
279, 283 (1945)).
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substantial nonexempt purpose destroys the exemption regardless of
the number or importance of the exempt purpose.”205
Clearly, the organizational test would prohibit a for-profit entity,
such as a cooperative, from obtaining tax-exempt status, as it would be
operated for the substantial private interests of the members of the
cooperative.206  That does not mean, however, that charitable and ed-
ucational activities within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) cannot occur in a
cooperative context even if the cooperative is not itself tax-exempt.  A
charity looking to further its tax-exempt mission by investing in a co-
operative must identify those charitable activities that it can support
and to tailor its assistance to further those activities.
B. Economic Development as Charitable Activity
Although the regulations under § 501(c)(3) do not expressly men-
tion it, the IRS has long held that economic development can further
tax-exempt charitable purposes. In most cases, economic development
activities combat community deterioration or provide relief to the
poor and underprivileged, which explicitly allows the activities to fall
within the regulatory definition of charitable.
Charitable economic development can encompass a number of dif-
ferent activities.  For example, economic development can include
providing technical assistance, training, and counseling to businesses
in blighted areas.207  It can even include loans to or equity investments
in businesses, so long as those loans or investments are designed to
combat community deterioration, provide relief to the poor, or other-
wise further an enumerated charitable purpose.208  Typically, these
types of investments are allowed if the business will provide training
or employment to under-employed communities.209  Key to these rul-
ings is that the organization funding economic development must have
a “clear and independent charitable purpose . . . in making funds
available to organizations not themselves exempt.”210
205. Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1065; see also Ky. Bar Found. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 921,
923 (1982) (citing Ohio Teamsters Trust Fund v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 189, 196 (1981) and Prof’l
Standards Review v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 240 (1980).
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii).  Of course, it would also fail the statutory private
inurement test as well. Id.
207. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-,C.B. 162 at 2; see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,992; Gen. Couns.
Mem. 35,076; Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,936.
208. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162.
209. Rev. Rul. 81-284, 1981-2 C.B. 130.
210. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,966 at 4; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,744 at 1 (“Rev.
Rul. 74-587 deals with an organization that had a clear and independent charitable purpose in
making funds available to organization not themselves exempt.”).
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Because economic development activities typically involve the pro-
vision of services or funds to for-profit business, they often raise seri-
ous private benefit concerns.  “The theory behind recognizing
economic development corporations as exempt under IRS 501(c)(3) is
that although services are provided directly to for-profit businesses,
the ultimate good received by the general public outweighs the private
benefit accorded to the direct beneficiaries.”211  In these cases, the
businesses are “merely the instruments by which the charitable pur-
poses are sought to be accomplished.”212
In Revenue Ruling 74-587, a § 501(c)(3) organization planned to
provide loans to or make equity investments in businesses in economi-
cally depressed urban areas, the residents of which were primarily mi-
norities or other disadvantaged groups.213  The funds would provide
working capital to businesses that were “not able to obtain funds from
conventional commercial sources because of the poor financial risks
involved in establishing and operating enterprises in these communi-
ties.”214  The charitable organization represented that any loan terms
would be designed to meet the needs of the business, and that equity
investments would only be held as long as necessary to provide for the
success of the business.215  Revenue Ruling 74-587 makes is clear that
a charity’s loan or investment in a business cannot be motived by
profit, but rather it must be motivated by the accomplishment of its
tax-exempt mission.216
211. Robert Louthian & Marvin Friedlander, G. Economic Development Corporations: Char-
ity Through the Back Door, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS–CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
ARTICLES (1992).
212. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162.
213. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162; see also I.R.S. General Couns. Mem. 35,936 (Aug. 7,
1974) approving of Rev. Rul. 74-587.  According to Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,936, the organization
in question in Rev. Rul. 74-587 was a Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Company
organized on a nonprofit basis.
214. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162.
215. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162.
216. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162.  This requirement was amplified by Revenue Ruling
81-284, which stated that an organization that was classified as a nonprofit small business invest-
ment company (SBIC) could qualify as tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3).  Rev. Rul. 81-284, 1981-2
C.B. 130.  SBICs were authorized by § 301(d) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, now
found at 15 U.S.C. § 681(d).  SBICs can make loans to or investments in and otherwise support
qualified small businesses subject to various limitations.  SBICs “are privately owned and oper-
ated to provide capital and long-term loans to small business . . . ”.  GCM 35,966 (August 27,
1974) at 1.  Under Small Business Administration regulations, a SBIC must set its loan rates in a
manner that, in the aggregate, would recover the costs of the organizations for making the loans.
The SBIC in Revenue Ruling 81-284 was organized and operated in an identical manner as the
organization described in Rev. Rul. 74-587, except for the additional limitations imposed on its
economic development activities by the SBIC regulations.
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When considering whether economic development activity is chari-
table, one of the key factors identified by the IRS is whether the activ-
ity will provide opportunities for full time employment in an area that
is chronically under-employed.217  For example, in Revenue Ruling
76-419, the IRS recognized the exempt status of an organization that
purchased blighted land and renovated for use as an industrial park in
an economically depressed area.  In selecting tenants for the industrial
park, the charity intended to select businesses that aimed to employ
and train otherwise unemployed individuals, with an emphasis on low
skill workers.218  Importantly, nothing in the Revenue Ruling required
the businesses themselves to be owned by minority or economically
challenged individuals.  Rather, providing opportunities for employ-
ment is seen as a way to combat community deterioration and to fight
poverty within the meaning of the definition of charitable for
§ 501(c)(3) purposes.219
The scope of permissible economic development activities is not un-
limited.  In GCM 35966,220 the IRS did not recognize a non-profit mi-
nority enterprise SBIC (ME SBIC) as tax-exempt.  A ME SBIC is a
SBIC221 that only loans money to or invests in businesses that are “at
least 50 percent owned and managed by members of disadvantaged
groups.”222  The business need not be located in a depressed geo-
graphical area, however, and there is no requirement that the business
be unable to access capital through conventional sources.223  Thus, the
mere fact that the businesses are owned by a disadvantaged group
would not be sufficient to establish that the ME SBIC operated for
217. See e.g., Rev. Rul.  74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162 (1974), discussed supra notes 213–227 and
accompanying text, which highlighted the need for employment opportunities in distressed ar-
eas; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,047 (Nov. 2, 1983) (emphasizing the ability “to provide
permanent full-time employment to area residents” as loan criteria).
218. Rev. Rul. 76-419, 1976-2 C.B. 146; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,298; I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 16, 1992) (emphasizing the role of providing employment to residents
in distressed areas in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,047).
219. Rev. Rul. 76-–419, 1976-–2 C.B. 146 (“The organization’s activities serve not only to
relieve poverty, but also to lessen neighborhood tensions caused by the lack of jobs and job
opportunities in the area.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2); see also Rossman, supra note 191, R
at 1463 (“An important subset of many [community development corporation’s] activities also
included local economic development as a mechanism for creating economic activity and jobs
within the community.”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 16, 1992) (“Potential for job
creation as a criterion in a proposal to take part in an economic development program in an
areas of high unemployment.”).
220. I.R.S. Gen. Counsel. Mem. 35,966 (Aug. 27, 1974).  The underlying ME SBIC statute was
later amended in a manner that allowed the IRS to recognize some ME SBICs as exempt. See
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,401 (Jun. 5, 1980).
221. For a description of the SBIC program, see supra note 216 and accompanying text.
222. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,966, at 3 (Aug. 27, 1974).
223. Id.
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charitable purposes.224  Similarly, Revenue Ruling 77-111225 held that
improving the general economic conditions in a depressed area is not
charitable, as the benefits of such actions would accrue to the disad-
vantaged and the well-off indiscriminately.  In distinguishing Revenue
Ruling 74-587, Revenue Ruling 77-111 noted that the improvement of
economic conditions as a general matter could not specifically target
businesses that could not get conventional financing or to those that
are owned by minorities or otherwise disadvantaged.226  Therefore,
the for-profit businesses that would benefit from the improvement in
economic conditions were neither owned by a charitable class, nor did
they serve as instruments to benefit a charitable class.227
In the case of a community development organization,228 General
Counsel Memorandum 39,883 helpfully summarizes these rulings into
a set of criteria for exemption as charitable:
1) whether assistance is being provided to help local businesses or to
attract new local facilities of established outside business, 2)
whether the type of assistance provided by the community develop-
ment organization has noncommercial terms and the potential to
revitalize the disadvantaged area, and 3) whether there is a nexus
between the business entities assisted and relieving the problems of
the disadvantaged area or between the businesses and a disadvan-
taged group, like a minority, in the area.229
The General Counsel Memorandum specifically notes that, with re-
gard to the second prong of the test, the assistance provided can be in
the form of loans or the purchase of equity interests.230  Sadly, neither
the General Counsel Memorandum, nor the private letter ruling to
which it relates are precedential,231 and this test has not been incorpo-
rated into other guidance.232
224. Id.
225. Rev. Rul. 77-111, 1977-1 C.B. 144.
226. Id.
227. See also Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210 (denying exemption to a block beautification
program on the basis that the residents of the block were not numerous enough to constitute a
charitable class, thereby providing a private benefit to the residents).
228. A community development organization—or CDC—was established as charitable
§ 501(c)(3) corporation empowered to meet a broad range of a distressed community’s needs.
See Rossman, supra note 191, at 1463. R
229. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,883, at 9 (Oct. 26, 1992).
230. Id.
231. General Counsel Memoranda (GCM), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/general-counsel-
memoranda-gcm (last updated Mar. 7, 2017) (“It is important to note that [General Counsel
Memoranda] cannot be used or cited as precedent.”); Tax Exempt Bonds Private Letter Rulings:
Some Basic Concepts, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/tax-exempt-bonds/teb-private-letter-ruling-some-
basic-concepts (last updated May 3, 2016) (“A PLR may not be relied on as precedent by other
taxpayers or by IRS personnel.”).
232. Rossman, supra note 191, at 1482 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-001 (May 1, 1992)). R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL404.txt unknown Seq: 37 20-SEP-17 14:54
2017] COOPERATIVES: THE FIRST SOCIAL ENTERPRISE1049
For a cooperative activity to qualify as charitable economic devel-
opment, the activity must benefit an objectively identifiable charitable
class (either directly or indirectly) and must target that activity in such
a manner to minimize any benefits accruing to private third parties.
Furthermore, a key to the various Revenue Rulings in the economic
development area is the inability of the benefitted business to obtain
conventional financing.  As discussed previously, cooperatives suffer
from a lack of capital due to their member service orientation and
their lack of preferential investor treatment.233  To some degree, it is
almost a given that a cooperative (especially a cooperative working in
areas of unemployment or poverty, or one that focuses on cottage in-
dustries with low margins) would be unable to obtain conventional
financing.
Proving employment opportunities to a charitable class that is
chronically under-employed clearly appears to qualify as charitable
economic development, whether directly or through investment in an
intermediary such as the employing business itself.234  By way of ex-
ample, consider a workers’ cooperative composed of recent immi-
grants from Central America that wish to roast and distribute fair-
trade coffee obtained from farms in their home countries.  While the
cooperative itself is for-profit, and therefore violates both the private
inurement and private benefit prohibitions of § 501(c)(3), which
would prevent the entity from qualifying as tax exempt.  That disquali-
fication of the entity from exempt status that does not prohibit some
of the cooperative’s underlying activities as being classified as charita-
ble.  If immigrants from Central America constitute a charitable class,
then it may be that the act of improving the employment opportuni-
ties for this class is, in isolation, a charitable activity.
C. Support of Labor as Charitable Activity
Clearly, charitable economic development activity focuses on job
creation in areas of underemployment as a way to combat poverty and
community deterioration.  Tax-exempt activity in support of labor is
not, however, limited to job creation.  The terms “charitable” and “ed-
ucational” with the meaning of § 501(c)(3) encompass job training,235
233. For discussion of capital formation difficulties in the discussion of next generation coop-
eratives, see supra Section I.C.3.c.
234. For a critique of the state of the law for evaluating charitable economic development, see
generally Rossman, supra note 191. R
235. For example, Goodwill Industries, while famous for its thrift stores, is exempt because it
provides employment opportunities and job training to difficult-to-employ populations, such as
the disabled and the recently incarcerated.  Arlene McCrehan, Goodwill’s Heritage, Mission,
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job search assistance and education of laborers regarding workers’
rights,236 and public interest litigation on labor issues.237
Worker centers are a fairly recent trend in the non-profit sector’s
support of labor.  Worker centers238 are “non-profit organizations that
typically provide services (like legal representation, know-your-rights
trainings, and sometimes job-search assistance) their low-wage mem-
bers.”239  For example, the National Day Laborer Organizing Net-
work (NDLON)240 is a § 501(c)(3) public charity241 that works to
improve the lives of day laborers in an effort “to protect and expand
their civil, labor and human rights” and to seek “safer, more humane
environments for day laborers, both men and women, to earn a living,
contribute to society, and integrate into the community.”242  NDLON
is a membership organization, which currently consists of at least
forty243 regional non-profit organizations that work with day labor-
ers.244  The organization sponsors research on labor issues and posts a
number of reports on its website.245  It has prepared a number of
Vision, and Values, GOODWILL, http://www.goodwill.org/about-us/goodwills-heritage-mission-vi-
sion-and-values/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
236. See, e.g., What Is VOZ?, VOZ WORKERS’ RIGHTS EDUC. PROJECT, http://portlandvoz
.org/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
237. See, e.g., About Us, IMPACT FUND, http://www.impactfund.org/aboutus/ (last visited Sept.
2, 2016) (“We provide strategic leadership and support for litigation to achieve economic and
social justice. We provide funds for impact litigation in the areas of civil rights, environmental
justice, and poverty law. We offer innovative technical support, training, and expertise on issues
that arise in large scale impact litigation. We serve as lead counsel, co-counsel, and amicus coun-
sel in select class action and impact litigation.”).
238. Rebecca J. Livengood, Organizing for Structural Change: The Potential and Promise of
Worker Centers, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 326 (2013).
239. Benjamin Sachs, Worker Centers and the “Labor Organization” Question, ON LABOR
(Sept. 1, 2013) https://onlabor.org/2013/09/01/worker-centers-and-the-labor-organization-ques-
tion/; see also Steven Greenhouse, The Workers Defense Project, a Union in Spirit, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/business/the-workers-defense-project-a-
union-in-spirit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2; Kris Maher, Worker Centers Offer a Backdoor Ap-
proach to Union Organizing, WALL STREET J. (July 24, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324144304578622050818960988.
240. See generally About Us, NDLON, ndlon.org/en/about-us (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).  An-
other example includes the Workers Defense Project. See About Us, WORKERS DEFENSE PRO-
JECT, http://www.workersdefense.org/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
241. A search of the “National Day Laborer Organizing Network” in the Exempt Organiza-
tion Select Check Tool is available on the irs.gov website listed the organization as a public
charity out of Los Angeles, California.
242. About Us, supra note 240. R
243. Id.
244. Apply for NDLON Membership, NDLON, ndlon.org/en/apply (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
245. Resources, NDLON, ndlon.org/en/resources (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
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trainings and fact sheets regarding workers’ rights246 and participated
in public interest litigation involving rights of immigrant workers.247
Educational activities that benefit labor can be similarly tax-ex-
empt, even if they are in connection with a particular industry.  In
Revenue Ruling 67-72,248 the IRS granted exemption to an apprentice
training program, which was created as a result of a collective bargain-
ing agreement.  Although the program was funded and administered
by a specific union and company, the program was open to all appli-
cants, and graduates were not required to work for the company.249
Similarly, Revenue Ruling 72-101250 granted exemption to an organi-
zation that administered a training program, which was also created as
a result of collective agreements and funded by industry employers to
train individuals working or desiring to work in that industry.  In each
case, it appears that the industry would have benefitted as a whole
from the increase in the number of qualified workers available for
employment; however, neither Revenue Ruling identified the private
benefit issues that would later be litigated in American Campaign
Academy.251
As with economic development organizations, workers’ centers and
training programs can run into private benefit issues.252  In Revenue
Ruling 76-31253 and Private Letter Ruling 2008-09-038,254 the IRS de-
nied exempt status to an organization working on behalf of school
teachers and school administrators, respectively, in a specific public
school district.  Although each organization engaged in some training
and issue advocacy activities, the IRS held that the organizations were
really unions255 in that they were bettering the employment opportu-
nities of a specific group of individuals working for a common em-
ployer.  In Private Letter Ruling 2011-20-036,256 the IRS denied
246. Know You Rights, NDLON, http://ndlon.org/en/resources/know-your-rights (last visited
Sept. 2, 2016).
247. Litigation, NDLON, http://ndlon.org/en/litigation (last visited July 4, 2017).
248. Rev. Rul. 67-72, 1967-1 C.B. 125.
249. Id.
250. Rev. Rul. 72-101, 1972-1 C.B. 144.
251. See supra Section III.A (discussing American Campaign Academy).
252. For a critique of workers centers as union organizing in disguise, see Heidi Abegg,
Worker Centers: Charities or Labor Organizations Masquerading as Charities?—and the Impact
of an IRS, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/worker-
centers-charities-or-labor-organizations-masquerading-as-charitiesand-the-impact-of-an-irs.
253. Rev. Rul. 76-31, 1976-1 C.B. 157 (Jan. 1, 1976) (concerning public school teachers in a
specific school system).
254. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-09-038 (Feb. 29, 2008) (concerning public school administrators
in a specific school district).
255. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) (2012).
256. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-20-036 (May 20, 2011).
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exempt status to an association of LGBT employees that worked for a
specific identified employer.  While educating the public about homo-
sexuality and advocating for LGBT rights are charitable and educa-
tional purposes,257 the fact that the association primarily advocated
for better working conditions on behalf of the employees of a certain
company violated the private benefit rule.258  As with American Cam-
paign Academy, it appears that the LGBT organization engaged in
tax-exempt educational activities, but the private benefit to the lim-
ited group of employees as well as their specific employer was suffi-
cient to overwhelm the otherwise tax-exempt purpose.
In order to qualify as a tax-exempt organization dedicated to pro-
moting labor, the labor force in question should constitute a charitable
class.  For example, Goodwill Industries works primarily with the dis-
abled and previously incarcerated, while NDLON works with day la-
borers, who are primarily recent immigrants (both legal and
undocumented).259
For workers’ cooperatives and producer cooperatives, these types of
activities may regularly occur.  In the case of the workers’ cooperative
focusing on Central American immigrants roasting fair trade coffee,
the cooperative may need to assist its workers with a variety of com-
pliance issues, as well as cultural integration issues (such as language
classes).  For a producer cooperative such as the West Virginia Hemp
Farmers’ Cooperative,260 the cooperative may provide training in legal
compliance or sustainable growing techniques.  Although these activi-
ties benefit the cooperatives’ members and raise private benefit issues,
this does not negate the existence of the otherwise charitable and edu-
cational activities undertaken on behalf of the cooperative.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE CHARITABLE SECTOR
IN FUNDING COOPERATIVES
Because a cooperative is generally a for-profit entity, it can only
very rarely be exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3).261  The purpose of
257. Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 CB 172.
258. Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 CB 172.
259. Arlene McCrehan, Goodwill’s Heritage, Mission, Vision, and Values, GOODWILL, http://
www.goodwill.org/about-us/goodwills-heritage-mission-vision-and-values/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2017).
260. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. R
261. The statutory language of § 501(c)(3) specifically states that “no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(2012).  There are specific exceptions for cooperatives of which all of the members are them-
selves § 501(c)(3) organizations. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(e) (regarding cooperative hospital as-
sociations); I.R.C. § 501(f) (regarding cooperative educational associations).
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establishing the dual charitable/for-profit nature of the cooperative is
not to qualify it for tax-exempt status; rather, the purpose is to allow a
charitable organization to invest in a cooperative in the same manner
as it might approach any other social enterprise.
A. Direct Support of Social Enterprise by Charities
Fundamentally, social enterprises (whether L3Cs, benefit corpora-
tions, cooperatives, or otherwise) are for-profit entities.  While “social
enterprise” may be a new concept, the old rules regarding investing in
and awarding grants to for-profit entities have not changed.  The na-
ture of these rules will depend on the investing charity’s tax: public
charity (with or without donor advised funds) or private foundation.
1. Section 501(c)(3) Investing Generally
For purpose of this Article, there are four different types of invest-
ing in which a § 501(c)(3) charity might engage: portfolio investing,
socially responsible investing, mission-related investing, and program-
related investing.262  For these purposes, portfolio investing merely
means investing assets purely on the basis of total return, which is
primarily governed by the requirements of the fiduciary duty of care
imposed by state law.263  With a standard portfolio investment, the
charity simply generates income to support its other charitable activi-
ties, but the investment itself is not charitable.264
If a charity invests assets, not just on the basis of return but also on
the basis of social concerns, then its investment approach falls into
262. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible, supra note 20, at 108. R
263. For charitable trusts, typically the Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 1 applies; for non-
profit corporations, the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act applies. See
Gary, Values and Value, supra note 11; see also Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible, supra note R
20, at 117. R
264. For state law purposes, a charitable trustee has a duty to make trust property productive.
See UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §§ 2, 7 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS. ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1995).  Similarly, the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Fund Act im-
poses a duty of prudent investment on covered charitable organizations. Id. § 3.  That said,
producing income destined for charity is not, in and of itself, charitable activity. See I.R.C. § 513
(2012); C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).  The provisions of the unrelated
business income tax appear to take the position that investment activities generally do not con-
stitute trade or business activities under § 162 and therefore usually would not be subject to the
UBIT; to the extent that one could argue investment is a trade or business, the comprehensive
exceptions for investment income found in § 512 make the question somewhat irrelevant.  More-
over, the debt-financed income rules of § 514 apply even if the underlying activity does not rise
to the level of a trade or business. See, e.g., Bartels Trusts v. United States, 617 F.3d 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Henry E. & Nancy Horton Bartels Trust v.  United States, 209 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that income from trading on margin is subject to the unrelated trade or business income
tax even if the underlying investment activity does not rise to the level of a trade or business).
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one of the three other categories.  Generally speaking, socially re-
sponsible investing requires the charity to consider the social impact
of the company in which it is investing as well as the financial return
of the company.265  For example, the movement to drive investors to
divest of South African companies in response to apartheid was so-
cially responsible investing.266  When engaging in socially responsible
investment, the charity still intends to invest for returns—it just
chooses to do so in a manner that encourages good societal behaviors
(or discourages bad ones).
The mission-related investment furthers a charity’s particular chari-
table purpose while still earning a return on the investment.267  The
mission-related investor intends to accomplish specific charitable
goals with its investment, rather than simply weigh the societal im-
pacts of its investment as would be the case with a socially responsible
investment.  For example, a foundation looking to further goals of in-
creased employment opportunities and security for a particular popu-
lation might elect to invest in a workers’ cooperative in a blighted
area.  With the mission-related investment, however, the charity is
once again still looking for some return on its investment.268
While the Internal Revenue Code does not define socially responsi-
ble investing or mission-related investing, a program-related invest-
ment is a definite product of the Code.  As more fully defined below,
a program-related investment is an investment made by a private
foundation primarily to accomplish charitable goals and not for the
production of income.269  When engaging in program-related invest-
ment, the private foundation’s desire for an investment return must be
subordinated to the accomplishment of charitable goals.270
265. Gary, Values and Value, supra note 11. R
266. Susan N. Gary, Is Mission Investing Prudent?, 2008 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. UTIL. L. REP. 6
[hereinafter Mission Investing]. See generally Paul Lansing, The Divestment of United States
Companies in South Africa and Apartheid, 60 NEB. L. REV. 304 (1981).  More recent examples
include movements to divest from tobacco companies or companies that make land mines. See,
e.g., Madison Marriage, Pension Funds Review Tobacco Divestment, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2006,
10:02 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/e87a9b3c-0708-11e6-9b51-0fb5e65703ce; Recommenda-
tion on Divestment from Arms Manufacturing Companies, U. OXFORD (Apr. 2012), https://www
.admin.ox.ac.uk/councilsec/governance/committees/srirc/report_march_2010/.  A socially respon-
sible investor may choose to only invest in companies with environmentally friendly policies or
fair labor standards.
267. Gary, Is Mission Investing Prudent, supra note 266, at 21. R
268. Id. at 20–21.
269. See I.R.C. § 4944 (2012).  For a more complete discussion, see supra Section IV.B.
270. See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2012) (“[I]nvestments, the primary purpose of which is to accom-
plish one or more of the purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), and no significant purpose of
which is the production of income or the appreciation of property, shall not be considered as
investments which jeopardize the carrying out of exempt purposes.”).
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2. Public Charities
A public charity is a § 501(c)(3) organization that is not classified as
a private foundation because it is described in § 509(a)(1), (2), or
(3).271  In general, a public charity is required to make sure that its
assets are used for its tax-exempt purposes.  In addition, state law gen-
erally imposes a fiduciary duty on a charity to make its assets
productive.272
When any § 501(c)(3) organization invests in a for-profit entity,
such as a cooperative, it must make sure that the investment furthers
its charitable mission.  With a standard portfolio investment, the char-
ity generates income to support its other charitable activities.  If the
return is so low that it must be justified in part by the accomplishment
of charitable goals, the investment might be treated as part invest-
ment, part charitable expenditure.273
When an equity investment in a company is not solely made for the
sake of return, but to further the charity’s mission through the direct
act of investment, then the charity is obligated to make sure that its
charitable goals will actually be accomplished.274  From a fiduciary
standpoint, the charity has sacrificed return on investment in ex-
change for a social benefit; accordingly, the charity ought to take steps
to ensure that social benefit is actually achieved.275  Allowing charita-
ble assets to be used for private purposes under the guise of invest-
ment would be a breach of the governing body’s fiduciary duty to
271. Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tan-
gled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2458 (2005).
272. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 801 (2000) (“[T]he trustee shall administer the trust in
good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries
. . . .”); id. § 802(a) (“A trustee shall administer a trust solely in the interest of the benefi-
ciaries.”).  The explanatory notes to Uniform Trust Code § 802(a) states as follows: “The duty of
loyalty applies to both charitable and noncharitable trusts, even though the beneficiaries of char-
itable trusts are indefinite.  In the case of a charitable trust, the trustee must administer the trust
solely in the interests of effectuating the trust’s charitable purposes.” Id. § 802 cmt. (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 379 cmt. a (1959)).
273. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible, supra note 20, at 111 (“If the charity decides to R
accept somewhat lower financial returns in order to obtain mission-related benefits, then the
investment may be considered an expenditure decision as well as an investment decision”).
274. Id. at 116–17 (“[S]ocial considerations may be taken into account in investing the funds
of charitable trusts to the extent the charitable purpose[ ] . . . justif[ies] an expenditure of trust
funds for the social issue . . . or . . . the investment . . . can be justified on grounds of advancing
. . . a charitable activity conducted by the trust.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 90 cmt. c (2007))).
275. That said, failure to achieve intended goals does not mean that an investment was flawed.
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1995).
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uphold the mission of the charity276 as well as a violation of
§ 501(c)(3).277
Accordingly, when making a mission-related investment, a public
charity can make a grant to or invest in a for-profit business, but only
if it takes steps to ensure that the funds are used for charitable pur-
poses.  Part of the rationale behind the creation of the social enter-
prise organizations is that they, by definition, pursue some level of
social benefit.  Therefore, a charity investing in a social enterprise
should have some level of assurance that a social benefit is being ac-
complished, purely by reason of the form of the organization.278  As
many commentators have noted, however, it can be difficult to quan-
tify the amount of benefit to be derived from a social enterprise,279
which may make it difficult for a governing body to rely solely on
form in complying with its legal obligation to safeguard charitable
assets.
3. Public Charites with Donor Advised Funds
Most public charities are subject only to the general limitations on
investments applicable to all § 501(c)(3) organizations.  If a public
charity, such as community foundation, manages donor advised funds
(DAFs) as part of its charitable program, additional rules apply.280
While the public charity that holds the DAFs are subject to the stan-
dard public charity rules, the DAFs themselves are subject two excise
taxes that govern to the investment and distribution of funds held in
the DAFs.281
Section 4966 imposes an excise tax on any “taxable distributions”
by a DAF, which includes any distribution for a charitable purpose
from a DAF to any non-public charity, unless the DAF’s sponsor exer-
cises “expenditure responsibility” over the grant.282  As described in
more detail below,283 expenditure responsibility is a comprehensive
series of administrative rules that are specifically designed to ensure
276. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); cf. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 5 cmts.
277. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2016); see also id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4).
278. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible, supra note 20, at 117 (“[A] trustee can consider the R
charitable purpose of a trust as a factor in making investment decisions.”).
279. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C.L. REV. 2052 (2013).
280. Donor advised funds are defined as “a fund or account, which is separately identified by
reference to contributions of a donor or donors, owned and controlled by a sponsoring organiza-
tion, and where the donor (or a person appointed or designated by the donor) has or reasonably
expects to have advisory privileges over the distribution or investments of the assets.  I.R.C.
§ 4966(d)(2) (2006).
281. I.R.C. §§ 4966–4967 (2006).
282. I.R.C. § 4966(c) (2006).
283. See supra Part III.B.
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that private foundation distributions to non-public charities further
charitable purposes; § 4966 applies these private foundation rules to
DAF distributions.284  By definition, a cooperative (or any other social
enterprise for that matter) is a non-public charity.285  As a result, any
DAF making a distribution to a cooperative would clearly need to
follow the expenditure responsibility rules over the distribution.286
What is unclear, however, is whether an equity investment in a coop-
erative (or other for-profit entity) made to further charitable purposes
constitutes a “distribution” within the meaning of § 4966.287  If the eq-
uity investment is in the nature of a part investment/part charitable
distribution mission-related investment, then there is a danger that the
investment could be treated as a “distribution” for § 4966 purposes.
In addition, § 4967 imposes an excise tax on “prohibited benefits,”
those being a distribution from a DAF on the advice of a person if
that person (or related entities) receives more than an incidental ben-
efit as a result of such distribution.288  Consequently, any distribution
from a DAF to a cooperative in which a person related to the DAF is
an equity owner, employee, or contractor, might raise prohibited ben-
efit issues.  While this may be a relatively rare situation, the charity
must implement provisions to screen for related person ownership,
thus raising the administrative costs of implementing a mission-related
investing program.
Sections 4966 and 4967 were enacted as part of the Pension Protec-
tion Act of 2006.289  Although these provisions have now been law for
ten years, the IRS has not yet issued regulations under this section.
As a result, it is difficult to determine the full extent of the application
284. “[E]xpenditure responsibility . . . means that the private foundation is responsible to
exert all reasonable efforts and to establish adequate procedures (1) to see that the grant is spent
solely for the purpose for which made, (2) to obtain full and complete reports from the grantee
on how the funds are spent, and (3) to make full and detailed reports with respect to such
expenditures to the Secretary.”  I.R.C. § 4945(h) (2014).
285. See I.R.C. § 509 (2006).
286. I.R.C. § 4966 (2006).
287. A taxable distribution under this section is defined as “any distribution form a donor
advised fund to an natural person or to any other person if such distribution is for any purpose
other than one specified in § 170(c)(2)(B) or the sponsoring organization does not exercise ex-
penditure responsibility with respect to such distribution . . .”.  I.R.C. § 4966(c) (2012).  One
might look to the minimum distribution rules of § 4942 for the definition of a distribution; how-
ever, § 4942 specifically treats program-related investments (or PRI) as distributions for these
purposes. See I.R.C. § 4942(d) (2012).  For the definition of a program-related investment, see
I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2012).  § 4942 would treat a mission-related investment that did not qualify as a
PRI under § 4944 as simply an investment, and not a distribution.
288. I.R.C. § 4967(a)(1) (2012).
289. Donor-Advised Funds Guide Sheet, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-008
.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2016).
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of § 4966 and § 4967 until further administrative guidance is forthcom-
ing.  Given the severity of the penalties under these provisions, most
practitioners are taking a cautious approach in the interim.290  For
those reasons, community foundations and other sponsors of DAFs
have been loath to allow DAF investments in cooperatives or other
types of social enterprise.
4. Private Foundations
Private foundations, in addition to complying with the general rules
of § 501(c)(3), must comply with the special rules contained in the
Chapter 42 private foundation excise taxes.291  A private foundation is
a § 501(c)(3) organization that is not a public charity (that is, it is not
described in § 509(a)(1), (2), or (3)).292  A private foundation often
receives the majority of its donations from a single source, such as an
individual, a family, or a company.  To prevent these donors from tak-
ing advantage of their special position, the Code imposes a series of
excise taxes designed to police private foundation behavior.293  A
number of these excise taxes can come into play when a private foun-
dation wishes to make a grant to or invest in a cooperative or other
social enterprise.
5. Section 4944 and Program-Related Investments
A private foundation can take one of two approaches to an invest-
ment in a social enterprise.  As with a public charity, the private foun-
dation can treat an investment in a social enterprise as just another
part of its investment portfolio.  If it takes this approach, the private
foundation needs to consider the fiduciary duty issues associated with
mission-related investing,294 described above, as well as § 4944.
Section 4944 prohibits investments that “jeopardize the carrying out
of” the charitable purpose of the foundation,295 which essentially acts
as a prudent investor rule for foundations.296  The Regulations place
special scrutiny on advanced investment products, such as commodity
290. For example, donors should check resources like Fidelity Charitable and the large foun-
dations for investment guidance especially those that allow donor discretion in investing. See,
e.g., Giving Strategies, FIDELITY CHARITABLE, https://www.fidelitycharitable.org/guidance/giv-
ing-strategies/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
291. I.R.C. ch. 42 (2012).
292. I.R.C. § 509(a) (2012).
293. See generally Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Better Late than Never: Incorporating LLCs
into Section 4943, 48 AKRON L. REV. 485, 489–90 (2015).
294. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible, supra note 20, at 108–28. R
295. I.R.C. § 4944(a) (2012).
296. See Wilson, supra note 293, at 489–90. R
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swaps and derivatives,297 although the Regulations do make it clear
that any particular investment can be appropriate in the context of the
allocation of its overall portfolio.298  If an investment in a cooperative
is made a part of the foundation’s overall investment strategy, the
foundation would need to ensure that the investments do not jeopard-
ize the charitable purpose of the foundation.299
Governing bodies may have a difficult time reconciling their obliga-
tion to not jeopardize the charitable purposes of the foundation with
their desire to engage in mission-related investing.300  In some in-
stances, mission-related investments can be more speculative, offer
lower rates of return and have a longer horizon for return on invest-
ment than a standard portfolio investment.301  While some large port-
folios may have a sufficiently diversified allocation of investments to
absorb the impact of a more speculative mission-related investment,
foundations with smaller investment portfolios may be leery of the
volatility and lack of cash flow that such investments might bring.302
For a foundation that is worried that a social enterprise investment
might violate the jeopardizing investment rules, there is an option.
Section 4944(c) provides that a “program-related investment” does
not jeopardize a foundation’s tax-exempt purpose.  A “program-re-
lated investment” has the following characteristics:
(1) The primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish charita-
ble purposes;303
(2) No significant purpose of the investment is the production of
income or the appreciation of property;304 and
(3) No part of the investment is used for political campaign or lob-
bying purposes.305
297. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (2016).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See id. § 53.4944-1(c) ex. 1.  Investment in Corporation Z, which “has been in business
for a short period of time and manufactures a product that is new, is not sold by others, and must
compete with a well-established alternative product that serves the same purpose” may be classi-
fied as a jeopardizing investment. Id.
301. See generally SARAH MAHLAB & BRAD HARRISON, COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., EFFECTIVE
AND EMERGING APPROACHES TO MISSION-RELATED INVESTING (2016), http://www.cof.org/sites/
default/files/documents/files/COF_WP_MRI.pdf; see also Commonfund Study of Responsible In-
vesting: A Survey of Endowments and Their Affiliated Foundations, COMMONFUND INST. 15
(2015); COMMONFUND INST. & COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., supra note 9, at 17 (discussing perceived R
lower investment performance as an impediment to MRIs).
302. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible, supra note 20. R
303. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(i) (2016).
304. I.R.C. § 4944; Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(ii).
305. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(iii) (“No purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or
more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(D)”).  Section 170(c)(2)(D) describes
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Under the regulations, an investment is made for the primary pur-
pose of accomplishing charitable goals if the investment “significantly
furthers the accomplishment of the private foundation’s exempt activ-
ities” and “the investment would not have been made but for” the
relationship to these exempt activities.306  The regulations further clar-
ify that a program-related investment can produce a positive rate of
return and still qualify as such; it is the intent of the foundation when
making the investment that is critical.307
Historically, the Regulations contained a number of examples of
program-related investments that date back to 1972.308  More re-
cently, the Treasury added additional examples that demonstrate the
modern trends in program-related investing.309  Example 1 in the Reg-
ulations describes loans to a small business in a “deteriorated urban
area” that is “owned by members of an economically disadvantaged
minority group,” for which “conventional sources of funds” are un-
available.310  This example tracks Revenue Ruling 74–587,311 which
found that investments in such a business would be charitable eco-
nomic development activities.
Similarly, Example 3 of the Regulations describes a loan to a busi-
ness that is not owned by a disadvantaged group, but that operates in
a blighted area and “is made pursuant to a program run by [the invest-
ing foundation] to assist low-income persons by providing increased
economic opportunities and to prevent community deterioration.”312
The facts in this example closely track Revenue Ruling 76-419, which
found an investment in an industrial park in a blighted area for pur-
poses of providing employment opportunities to be charitable eco-
nomic development activity.313
Example 6 describes an investment in a non-profit community de-
velopment corporation that would market agricultural products of low
§ 501(c)(3)’s limitation on lobbying activities and the prohibition on political campaign activities.
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(iv).
306. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i).
307. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(iii).
308. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944 (1972).
309. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944(c) (2016) (“Paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and (b), Examples 11 through
19 of this section, apply on or after April 25, 2016.”).
310. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 1; see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 2 (extension of
time to pay allowable); Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 3 (purchase of stock to increase capitaliza-
tion to allow for conventional financing allowable).
311. See supra Section III.B.
312. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 3.
313. See supra Section III.B.
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income farmers.314  In reality, most early agricultural marketing coop-
eratives were in corporate form;315 accordingly, this example clearly
indicates that supporting marketing cooperatives can be a charitable
activity if the farmers constitute a charitable class.
One of the new examples, Example 16, indirectly discusses coopera-
tives.  In Example 16, the business itself is not a cooperative; however,
it purchases coffee from poor farmers residing in a developing coun-
try, either directly or through farmer-owned cooperatives.316  The
foundation makes the PRI in order to fund training in environmen-
tally sustainable farming practices for the farmers in directly through
the business.  This example tracks the circumstances in Aid for Arti-
sans,317 where the charity at issue purchased handicrafts from local
artisans through an artisans’ cooperative.318
Accordingly, a private foundation might be able to qualify its mis-
sion-related investment in a cooperative as a PRI.319  Not only will
qualification as a PRI protect a private foundation from the § 4944
excise tax, PRI classification can assist the foundation with compli-
ance with other private foundation excise tax requirements.  If a par-
ticular cooperative investment does not qualify as a PRI, then the
private foundation can still make the investment; it merely means that
the governing body of the foundation must evaluate the investment
within the context of its larger investment allocation for purposes of
§ 4944 compliance.  Fortunately, Treasury made this decision some-
what easier in 2015, when it issued guidance indicating that an invest-
ment made for charitable purposes that does not qualify as a PRI is
not automatically a jeopardizing investment.320  Rather, the governing
body must exercise ordinary care and prudence when evaluating the
investment, but it may take in to account “the relationship between a
particular investment and the foundation’s charitable purposes” when
exercising that care.321
6. Section 4945 and Expenditure Responsibility
A public charity is free to set whatever parameters it deems appro-
priate to make sure that a mission-related investment is used for chari-
314. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 6; see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 15 (discussing
farmers’ roadside fruit stand for poor farmers as a program-related investment).
315. See supra Section II.C.3.a.
316. Treas. Reg. § 53-4944-3(b) ex. 16.
317. 71 T.C. 202 (1978).
318. See supra notes 258 and 259 and accompanying text. R
319. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a) (2016).
320. I.R.S. Notice 2015-62, 2015-39 I.R.B. 411.
321. Id. at 3.
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table purposes.  For a private foundation, § 4945 sets forth the
procedures required for grants to for-profit entities such as coopera-
tives.  These procedures, referred to as “expenditure responsibility,”
are found in § 4945(h) and its accompanying regulations.322  The ex-
penditure responsibility requirements are extremely technical;323 as a
result, many private foundations will not make expenditure responsi-
bility grants.324  Failure to meet the expenditure responsibility require-
ments for a grant to a for-profit entity will cause the grant to be
classified as a taxable expenditure subject to excise tax.325
A private foundation must exercise expenditure responsibility over
any grant to an organization that is not a public charity under § 509,
with limited exceptions.326  In order to comply with the expenditure
responsibility rules, a private foundation must “exert all reasonable
efforts” and “establish adequate procedures” to
(1) ensure that the grant is used solely for charitable purposes;327
(2) obtain full reports on the manner in which the grant funds are
spent;328 and
(3) make full reports on the grants to the IRS as part of its annual
information filing.329
By virtue of § 4966, the expenditure responsibility rules apply to
distributions from DAFs to for-profit entities, which may include mis-
sion-related investments.330  Because the expenditure responsibility
rules constitute a statement from Congress and the IRS of what con-
stitutes adequate procedures to ensure that the charity is accomplish-
322. I.R.C. § 4945 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5.
323. See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b).
324. See, e.g., Grant Program, RGK FOUND., http://www.rgkfoundation.org/public/guidelines
(last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (“Grants are made only to nonprofit organizations certified as
tax–exempt under Sections 501(c)(3) or 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code and are classified
as ‘not a private foundation’ under Section 509(a).”).  For more info, see Grants by Private Foun-
dations: Expenditure Responsibility, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Private-
Foundations/Grants-by-Private-Foundations:-Expenditure-Responsibility (last updated June 10,
2016).
325. See I.R.C. § 4945(a) (2012).
326. Technically, § 4945 does not require expenditure responsibility for grants to public chari-
ties described in § 509(a)(1) or (2), to supporting organizations described in § 509(a)(3) other
than certain controlled and Type III non-functionally integrated supporting organizations de-
scribed in § 4942(g)(4)(A), or exempt operating foundations described in § 4940(d)(2). See
I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4).
327. I.R.C. § 4945(h)(1).
328. I.R.C. § 4945(h)(2).
329. I.R.C. § 4945(h)(3); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(d) (2016).
330. See infra note 362 and accompanying text. R
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ing a charitable purpose, many public charities use the expenditure
responsibility rules as voluntary best practices.331
For purposes of § 4945, the term “grant” includes loans made for
charitable purposes and PRIs, which are therefore subject to the ex-
penditure responsibility rules.332  In order to meet the first require-
ment of the expenditure responsibility rules, it is necessary to establish
that the PRI was used solely for charitable purposes333—once again, it
is necessary to identify the underlying charitable purpose served by
the investments and to take appropriate steps to make sure that the
funds are used for those charitable purposes.  Under the Regulations,
this requires three steps:  a pre-grant inquiry, tailoring the terms of the
grant to make sure that the funds are used appropriately, and ob-
taining appropriate reporting.334
First, the Regulations require a foundation to make an inquiry into
the potential recipient that should be “complete enough to give a rea-
sonable man assurance” that the fund will be used for charitable pur-
poses.335  The inquiry will vary depending upon the nature of the
organization.336  In the context of a PRI, the foundation should specif-
ically consider the identity, prior history, experience of organization
and its managers, and any other information “which is readily availa-
ble concerning the management, activities, and practices of the
grantee organization.”337  Additional factors to consider include the
size of the grant, its purpose, the pay period, and the grantor’s prior
experience with the grantee’s use of grants for the proper purposes.338
All expenditure responsibility grants, including PRIs, must have a
written grant agreement that contains certain terms,339 specifically in-
cluding the purpose of the grant and an agreement to use the grant
funds only for the stated purposes.340  In addition to the general ex-
331. See Karen Dunn, Public Charity Grant Making—Due Diligence and Reporting, CLARK
NUBER (Apr. 29, 2015), https://clarknuber.com/articles/public-charity-grant-making-due-dili-
gence-and-reporting/ (“Commonly recognized best practices recommend that charities develop
policies, systems, and procedures for pre-grant inquiry, grant monitoring, and post-grant report-
ing similar to the “expenditure responsibility” requirements for private foundations.”).
332. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(a)(2).
333. For example, a traditional grant made to further the activities of an economic develop-
ment organization would be treated as made for charitable purposes. See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 16, 1992).
334. See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b).
335. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(2).
336. Id.
337. Id.; see also David A. Levitt, Investing in the Future: Mission-Related and Program-Re-
lated Investments for Private Foundations, PRACTICAL TAX LAW. 33, 38 (2011).
338. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(2).
339. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(3).
340. Id.
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penditure responsibility grant agreement rules, there are specific rules
for PRIs.341  PRI funds must be used only for the purposes of the in-
vestment; as a result, it is necessary to clearly identify the purpose of a
PRI.  Identifying the purpose of a PRI can be difficult in the context
of a for-profit business entity; therefore, it is incumbent on a founda-
tion to develop specific definitions and deliverables in order to make
sure that the funds are used for a charitable purpose.  For example, if
a foundation were to make an investment in a cooperative that would
market the products of low income farmers (as provided in Example 6
of the PRI regulations under § 4944),342 it would need to provide a
definition of “low income” in the grant agreement.  This may (or may
not) coincide with the cooperative’s own definition of who may be a
member of the cooperative.
A mission-related investment that does not qualify as a PRI, how-
ever, is merely another part of a charity’s investment portfolio.343
§ 4945 would not require a foundation to exercise expenditure respon-
sibility over its investment in Microsoft; similarly, it would not require
a foundation to exercise expenditure responsibility over an investment
in a cooperative.344  This leaves a foundation with a choice: (1) qualify
the cooperative investment as a PRI, which gives the foundation the
benefit of exemptions from the general rule of § 4944 (as well as
§ 4942345 and § 4943346) but comply with the requirements of expendi-
341. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(4).
342. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 ex. 6; see also infra note 387 and accompanying text. R
343. See David A. Levitt, Investing in the Future: Mission-Related and Program-Related Invest-
ments for Private Foundations, 3 PRACTICAL TAX LAW. 33, 39 (2011).
344. It may be, however, that the rules applicable to DAFs may be more stringent than the
rules applicable to private foundations in this regard, as there is little guidance over what types
of transactions § 4966 was designed to cover.
345. Section 4942 generally requires a private foundation to make annual expenditures and
distributions for charitable purposes equal to five percent of the fair market value of its invest-
ment portfolio. See generally Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Private Foundations—Distributions
(Section 4942), BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO 472 (2015). If an investment is just a portfolio
investment, it does not count toward the five percent distribution requirement. A “qualifying
distribution” is:
(A) any amount (including that portion of reasonable and necessary administrative ex-
penses) paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B),
other than any contribution to (i) an organization controlled (directly or indirectly) by
the foundation or one or more disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) with
respect to the foundation, except as provided in paragraph (3), or (ii) a private founda-
tion which is not an operating foundation (as defined in subsection (j)(3)), except as
provided in paragraph (3), or
(B) any amount paid to acquire an asset used (or held for use) directly in carrying out
one or more purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B).
I.R.C. § 4942(g) (2012).  Any private foundations that want to get credit for investments made
for charitable purposes in the same way that they are credited for distributions must qualify the
investment as a program-related investment.  I.R.C. § 4942 (g)(4).
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ture responsibility, or (2) treat the investment not as a mission-related
investment that is not covered by the expenditure responsibility rules
but as any other portfolio investment for purposes of the other private
foundation excise tax rules.
B. Investing in the “New” Social Enterprises
The tax rules associated with investing in for-profit entities such as
cooperatives for mission purposes are complicated to say the least—
even more so in the case of private foundations.  The complex rules
can discourage a charity from pursing more mission-relating (or for
foundations, program-related)347 investing.348  In spite of this com-
plexity, mission-related investing is attractive to charities because it
allows them to impact their respective areas of interest in a holistic
way.349  More pragmatically, these investments allow a charity to im-
pact an issue in a way that minimizes the need for cash available for
346. Section 4943 generally limits the amount of equity holdings a private foundation may
own in an active business enterprise. See I.R.C. § 4943.  Section 4943(d)(3) provides an excep-
tion from the excess business holdings rules for “functionally related businesses.”  I.R.C.
§ 4943(d)(3).  By regulation, a functionally related business includes PRIs, as well as related
businesses that are carried on within a larger complex of other endeavors that are related to
accomplishing the private foundation’s charitable mission.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-10(b) (citing
Treas. Reg. 53.4942(a)-2(c)(3)(iii)).  Clearly, an investment in a cooperative that qualifies as a
PRI would not need to worry about the excess business holdings rules.
If an investment in a cooperative did not qualify as a PRI (i.e., it is a mission-related invest-
ment that was made to accomplish a double bottom line), then the foundation would need to
either treat it as a functionally related business or comply with the standard excess business
holdings rules applicable to all operating business entities.  There is very little in the way of
precedent with regard to the exception for functionally related business that are not qualified as
PRIs, so a private foundation would need to consider this route carefully. See generally Wilson,
supra note 293. R
347. See, e.g., THOMAS REUTERS FOUND., STRATEGIES TO MAXIMIZE YOUR PHILANTHROPIC
CAPITAL: A GUIDE TO PROGRAM RELATED INVESTMENTS 20–21 (2012), https://www.mission-
investors.org/system/files/tools/ximize-your-philanthropic-capital-a-guide-to-program-related-in-
vestments-lucia-benabentos-justin-storms-carlos-teuscher-and-jon-van-loo-linklaters-llp.pdf.pdf
(regarding the procedures for making PRIs in the form of loans).
348. Rick Cohen, Social Responsibility or Marketing Ploy? The Branding of L3Cs, NPQ (May
27, 2014), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2014/05/27/social-responsibility-or-marketing-ploy-the-
branding-of-l3cs/ (“The reluctance of many foundations to make PRIs is fundamental: the afore-
mentioned predisposition toward making grants rather than debt or equity investments (which
they can make from their endowments as mission-related investments with more flexibility than
the strictures of PRIs); discomfort with the notion of underwriting debt and equity (more of a
banker’s skill set than a grantmaker’s); and an aversion to assuming the monitoring and report-
ing requirements involved in fulfilling the expenditure responsibility dimensions of PRIs.”).
349. Steven Godeke & Doug Bauer, Philanthropy’s New Passing Gear: Mission-Related In-
vesting A Policy and Implementation Guide for Foundation Trustees, ROCKEFELLER PHILAN-
THROPY ADVISORS 13 (2008), http://docplayer.net/17329194-Rockefeller-mission-related-invest
ing-a-policy-and-implementation-guide-for-foundation-trustees-philanthropy-s-new-passing-gear
.html (“There is an idea that values are divided between the financial and the societal, but this a
fundamentally wrong way to view how we create value.”).
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distribution.  After all, an investment in a social enterprise is still an
investment and it remains on the charity’s balance sheet as such.  To
the extent that the social enterprise earns any rate of return, the char-
ity is able to impact its mission area without expending assets but
while earning income.350  This is an especially great advantage to pri-
vate foundations, which can comply with the five percent distribution
requirement of § 4942351 without actually parting with assets.352
While all businesses are on a continual search for capital, social en-
terprises quickly identify charities with investment assets (e.g., private
foundations, DAFs, and university endowments) as sources for that
capital.353  This search for capital can be especially problematic for
social enterprises (such as cooperatives) that may not attract tradi-
tional venture capital investors that are solely interested in the invest-
ment’s rate of return.354  This fundamental economic issue is
exacerbated by the unique legal and tax limitations imposed upon
mission investing by charities.  In recognition of the significant hurdles
to accessing charitable investment pools, businesses with a dual bot-
tom line mission looked for ways to smooth the entry of charitable
capital.355
By definition, an investment in a social enterprise may have a lower
and more difficult to measure rate of return than a standard market
investment.356  In addition, social enterprises often require what is re-
ferred to as “patient capital”—that is, the social enterprise will not
have excess profit to distribute for a significant amount of time, so
investors must wait to realize any returns.357  While a charity can jus-
350. THOMAS REUTERS FOUND., supra note 347, at 3–4. R
351. See supra note 345 and accompanying text. R
352. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2012); Levitt, supra note 343, at 37; see also Godeke & Bauer, supra R
note 349, at 12. R
353. Cohen, supra note 348 (“Marketing a brand leads a business to sources of investment. R
Where might the nation’s L3Cs find capital to advance their programs, which are ostensibly
geared toward a core commitment to achieving charitable missions? The answer lies in private
investment and PRIs.”).
354. Robert Lang, the self-proclaimed creator of the L3C, estimates that the “low profit” in
the “low profit limited liability company” should equal a return on investment between 1 and
5%. See Cohen, supra note 348. R
355. Cohen, supra note 348. R
356. Deb Lavoy, Social Enterprise ROI: Measuring the Immeasurable, CMS WIRE (Apr. 12,
2012), http://www.cmswire.com/cms/social-business/social-enterprise-roi-measuring-the-immea-
surable-015149.php.
357. Brian Trelstad, Patient Capital in an Impatient World, in 1 KAUFFMAN FELLOWS REPORT
(2010).
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tify a mission-related investment with a lower rate of return,358 it does
so on the understanding that it is achieving a charitable benefit.
The L3Cs were specifically designed to meet the criteria for pro-
gram-related investments, the rules set forth in § 4944, thereby mak-
ing it easier for foundation money to capitalize social enterprises.359
Vermont passed the first L3C statute in 2008.360  Under the Vermont
statute, a duly organized limited liability company (LLC) can elect to
be governed by the additional statutory limitations applicable to
L3Cs.361  In order to qualify as a L3C, the LLC organized for a busi-
ness purpose362 must at all times:
(1) “Significantly further “one or more charitable or educational
purposes”;363
(2) “Would not have been formed but for the company’s relation-
ship to the accomplishment of charitable and educational
purposes”;364
(3) “No significant purpose of the company is the production of in-
come or the appreciation of property; provided, however, that
the fact that a person produces significant income or capital ap-
preciation shall not, in the absence of other factors, be conclu-
sive evidence of a significant purpose involving the production
of income or the appreciation of property”;365 and
(4) “No purpose of the company is to accomplish one or more po-
litical or legislative purposes within the meaning of 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(c)(2)(D).”366
Quite intentionally, the language of the Vermont L3C mirrors exactly
the language of the PRI Treasury Regulations.367  L3C organizers in-
tended that an investment in a duly organized L3C would automati-
358. But see Gary, ESG Investing, supra note 11 describing various studies showing returns on R
socially responsible funds and impact investing funds
359. See infra Part III.A.
360. Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” On the
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 879 (2010).
361. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 4161 (2015).
362. Id. § 4162.
363. Id. § 4162(1)(A).
364. Id. § 4162(1)(B).
365. Id. § 4162(2).
366. Id. § 4162(3).
367. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4162, with Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 (2016). See, e.g.,
Anne Field, Court Ruling Means L3Cs Should Vet Their Social Mission Carefully, FORBES (May
31, 2015, 12:08 PM), http://www.marcjlane.com/news/2015/06/01/in-the-news/court-ruling-means-
l3cs-should-vet-their-social-mission-carefully/ (“[The L3C] was created with the idea that the
companies could serve as Program-Related Investments (PRIs), which are entities with a chari-
table or educational purpose that can receive foundation money.”).
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cally qualify as a PRI, as the regulatory PRI requirements were
incorporated into the very structure of the entity.368
Unfortunately for the proponents of L3Cs, the IRS has not agreed
with their contention that an investment in a L3Cs would automati-
cally qualify for PRI status.369  The primary issue is that § 4944 focuses
upon the intent of the foundation in making the investment, not on
the intent of the business in running its operations.  The Vermont stat-
ute provides that the company “would not have been formed but for
“the relationship to the charitable purpose and that “no significant
purpose of the company” is the production of income or appreciation.
On the other hand, § 4944(c) states that a PRI is an “investment[ ] . . .
no significant purpose of which is the production of income.”370  Be-
cause the motivations of the creators of the company cannot be attrib-
uted to the charitable investors, L3Cs cannot automatically qualify as
PRIs under current law.  In response, legislation has been introduced
to make it easier for L3Cs to obtain automatic PRI status, which has
to date not gathered significant support.371  In the absence of further
federal guidance, the growth in L3Cs has slowed, with at least one
jurisdiction repealing its statute.372
Benefit corporations took a different approach toward encouraging
charitable capital.  Historically, a business corporation could engage in
some level of charitable activity consistent with its obligation to its
shareholders to maximize value if the activity was in the best interest
of the corporation in the judgment of the board.373  The public battles
368. Cohen, supra note 348 (“Some L3C advocates want foundations’ awarding of PRIs to R
L3Cs to be easier and more automatic.  They decry the need, for instance, of the IRS opinion
letters that foundations frequently seek as legal cover for making PRIs—presumably seeing
them as a reason why foundations do not often make such investments in general, much less
PRIs to L3Cs.”); see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66
STAN. L. REV. 387, 395–96 (2014).
369. Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies: High-Risk Tax Fad or
Legitimate Social Investment Planning Opportunity?, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 35, 42 (2014)
(“[T]he IRS has never expressly announced that L3Cs will qualify as PRIs.”); Mayer & Ganahl,
supra note 368, at 397–98 (“Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service has refused requests to R
issue rulings that would deem an equity investment or loan to an L3C as a PRI automatically.”).
370. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(ii)
(2016) (“No significant purpose of the investment is the production of income or the appreciation
of property.” (emphasis added)).
371. See, e.g., Philanthropic Facilitation Act, H.R. 2832, 113th Cong. § 2(c)(3) (2013) (provid-
ing a process where by an L3C can obtain a safe harbor determination that investments in it
would be a PRI).
372. North Carolina repealed its L3C statute effective January 1, 2014. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 57C-2-01–57C-2-19 (repealed 2014); see also Cohen, supra note 348. R
373. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (1953) (holding that the plaintiff
could give money to charities providing that the total did not exceed the statutory maximum
because corporate gift-giving increases the goodwill of the corporation).
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of Craigslist and Ben & Jerry’s, however, demonstrated the potential
primacy of shareholder value (at least in a takeover-type transac-
tion)374 and the limits on the traditional business judgment rule as the
defender of board decision making.375  Whether or not their fears
were warranted, these battles at least put risk-adverse boards of direc-
tors on notice that the pursuit of social goals would not always be
tolerated by shareholders or supported by courts.376
In response, states took two different paths.  The first path involved
the passage of constituency statutes.377  Constituency statutes allowed
a business corporation’s board to consider the interests of various
stakeholders other than just the shareholders’ when making corporate
decisions.378  These statutes, however, have been criticized as being
permissive and in some cases, as only being applicable in takeover-
type situations.379  In addition, some argue that constituency statutes
still require the board of directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation when considering the interests of other stakeholders,
which effectively negates the board’s ability to elevate these other in-
terests over shareholder value.380
The other path was the creation of the benefit corporation.381  The
Model Benefit Corporation legislation382 provides that a benefit cor-
poration “shall” have a purpose of creating a general public benefit in
addition to its traditional business purpose.383  The statute then at-
tempts to negate shareholder primacy by stating that the creation of
the public benefits is in the best interests of the corporation and, thus,
can be valued by a board of directors when contemplating corporate
374. Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 368, at 393–94. R
375. See supra Section II.C.3.c.
376. For a discussion of both the Craigslist and the Ben & Jerry’s fiduciary duty fights, see
Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 368, at 393–94; J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: So- R
cial Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statues, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-15
(2012).
377. See Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 368, at 394. R
378. Id.
379. See id.
380. Id.; see also Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087–88 (2000).
381. For a history of the Model Benefit Corporation statute, see Mayer & Ganahl, supra note
368, at 398; Matthew J. Dulac, Note, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit Corpora- R
tions and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L. J. 171, 175 (2015).  In this regard, some states
have not adopted a version of this benefit corporation legislation but have developed their own
varieties, such as California’s social purpose corporation and the Washington social purpose
corporation. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517 (West 2012); WASH REV. CODE
§§ 23B.25.005–23B.25.150 (2012).
382. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(a) (B LAB 2016).
383. Id.  It may also have specific enumerated public benefits. See id. § 201(b).
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actions.384  The Model Benefit Corporation statute also includes a
mandatory constituency-type provision, which requires the board to
consider the interests of shareholders, employees, the workforce gen-
erally, suppliers, beneficiaries of its public benefit, community, society
at large, and the environment in the decision-making process.385  In
order to oversee and measure this public benefit, benefit corporations
are required to file an annual benefit report,386 which includes an as-
sessment of the public benefits provided as compared to a third-party
benchmark.387
Unlike the L3C, a benefit corporation does need to generate “low
profit,” presumably making it more attractive to a charitable investor
looking to generate a return as well as further its mission.  Moreover,
the requirement of a general public good388 and the provisions requir-
ing consideration of stakeholders other than shareholders are
mandatory, unlike the L3C or constituency legislation.389  The benefit
corporation statutes presumably require a business to take into ac-
count goals other than pure profit generation, which should theoreti-
cally make it easier for a charity to argue that its investment
accomplishes charitable goals.  Practically, that may always be the
case.390
C. The Cooperative as the First Social Enterprise
Upon a review of the new social enterprise hybrid entities, it ap-
pears that cooperatives have been functioning as a form of social en-
384. Id. § 201(c) (B LAB 2016).
385. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a) (B LAB 2016). See, e.g., W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 31F-4-401(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2014); see also Murray, supra note 376, at 16–25 (comparing R
benefit corporations with constituency statutes).
386. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a) (B LAB 2016).  Note that West Virginia
did not adopt the public filing provision.
387. In this regard, the most popular third party standard has been developed by B Lab and
branded as the “B Corp” or “B Corporation.”  Matthew J. Dulac, Note, Sustaining the Sustaina-
ble Corporation: Benefit Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L. J. 171,
174–175 (2015).  Although the names are similar, a benefit corporation is not the same as a B
Corporation, which is an entity (which need not be a corporation) that has met B Lab’s propriety
standard. Id.  Not surprisingly, B Lab assisted in the creation of the Model Benefit Corporation
statue. Id.; Murray, supra note 376, at 21. R
388. One of the critiques of the benefit corporation is that there no sense of how important
the general public good need be in comparison to the profit motive.  Mayer and Ganahl, supra
note 368, at 428 (“[M]otive itself is really irrelevant to the granting of subsidy and the measura- R
ble public benefit flowing from an activity is the proper object of public subsidy, not benevolent
motives regardless of their value.”).
389. While mandatory, the governing body need only consider it, not give it any particular
required weight. See Mayer and Ganahl, supra note 368, at 426. R
390. Id. (discussing the perils inherent in balancing the interests of the multiple stakeholders
of a benefit corporation).
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terprise for roughly one hundred fifty years before the first
appearance of the L3C in Vermont in 2008.391  Both today’s social en-
trepreneurs and the originators of the modern cooperative share the
ethos of social movement.392  Proponents of social enterprise posit
that the combination of for-profit methods and the charitable out-
comes can enhance, not distract from, the organization’s charitable
mission.393  In fact, social enterprise advocates highlight the opportu-
nity for “individual experimentation and the exercise of creative imag-
ination”394 in the entrepreneurial-minded.395
And yet, the cooperative, with its concurrent social and economic
goals, has been operating in this space in the United States since the
Civil War.  From its inception with the Rochdale Pioneers, the cooper-
ative has always had a dual bottom line orientation.  The Rochdale
cooperative was born to address the social upheavals, displacement,
and poverty caused by the Industrial Revolution.  The values and les-
son learned by the Rochdale Pioneers were ultimately embedded into
the organizational principles of the cooperative: democracy, equality,
fair dealing, and a commitment to economic opportunity for its strug-
gling members and their neighborhoods.396  At its inception, Rochdale
was always more than a way to get unadulterated food; it was a social
experiment in self-help for struggling communities.397
Economists in the United States and elsewhere recognized this dual
nature.  At the turn of the twentieth century, both Aaron Sapiro and
Edwin Nourse viewed cooperatives as a way to assist impoverished
farm communities to compete with larger growers and find a better
391. See The Rochdale Principles, supra note 29; see also Thomas A. Kelley, Law and Choice R
of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 340 n.6 (2009) (citing James J.
Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit Landscape: A Need
for New Legal Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L REV. 567, 603–06 (2007)).
392. Kelley, supra note 391, at 338 (citing David Gergen, The New Engines of Reform, U.S. R
NEWS & WORLD REP 48 (2006)).
393. The Social Enterprise Alliance is one of the primary organizations promoting social en-
terprise, stating that social enterprise is the “Missing Middle,” combining efficiency, sus-
tainability, creativity, and generosity in a way not seen in the traditional sectors of the economy.
See Social Enterprise, SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enter-
prise/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017); see also Kelley, supra note 391, at 374. R
394. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TREASURY DEP’T REP. ON PRIVATE
FOUNDS. 35 (Comm. Print 1965).
395. Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 368, at 427 (“Social entrepreneurs . . . . desire the flexibility R
to seek non-traditional approaches in conducting their business and to access a broad range of
capital.”).
396. See supra Section II.A.1.
397. See supra Section II.A.1; see also GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE, THE HISTORY OF THE
ROCHDALE PIONEERS, 1844–1892 (2013).
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way.398  The work of economist Georg Draheim in the 1950s clearly
established the dual nature of the cooperative as part social associa-
tion, part firm.399  Even today, some social-capital-economic theorists
believe that the strength of the cooperative is its dual nature: Without
its social commitment to members’ interests, its alternative capital na-
ture might not be workable.400
Today, the modern cooperative movement explicitly recognizes
public good and social values as principles inherent to the cooperative
movement.  The ICA’s cooperative principles clearly include concern
for community, education, and sustainability among its core values.401
The cooperative principles of democracy and a commitment to mem-
ber interest at the expense of profit have always been embedded in
the legal structures that form cooperatives.  From the Rochdale Prin-
ciples to Sapiro’s Marketing Act, the Capper–Volstead Act, and Sub-
chapter T of the Code, these principles define the legal cooperative.
With the inception of the constituency provisions in the Wisconsin
NGC statute and the Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act,
the concern for community, economic development, and equal oppor-
tunity that have always been a part of the cooperative movement are
now explicitly incorporated into the legal entity structure of the
cooperative.
Much like the L3C, the cooperative structure explicitly recognizes
that that the entity is formed not merely to pursue profit, but to ac-
complish other goals that may, in fact, sacrifice profit.  Cooperative
legislation has always acknowledged the need to consider constituen-
cies other than capital interests; these provisions are paralleled in ben-
efit corporation legislation, which explicitly empowers boards to
consider the needs of the workforce, the community, and the environ-
ment.  When compared side-by-side, the constituency provisions of
the Model Benefit Corporation Statute and the Uniform Limited Co-
operative Association Act are strikingly similar.
All three organizations purport to be responsive to third-party stan-
dards of public benefit.  The L3C incorporates the standards of
charitability set forth in the Internal Revenue Code through its ex-
plicit adoption of the program-related investment provisions of
§ 4944.402  The Model Benefit Corporation statute requires a benefit
398. See supra Section II.B.1 (“The justification of cooperative marketing is that it has been
the means of a more progressive form of living and superior type of citizenship, as well as an
economic remedy.”).
399. See supra Section II.B.1.
400. See supra Section II.B.2.
401. For discussion of the ICA cooperative principles, see supra Section II.A.3.
402. See supra Sections IV.A & IV.B.
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corporation to  file a benefit report annually, which incorporates
third-party standards regarding general public benefit.403  While the
cooperative movement held to the Rochdale principles for much of its
early history, the modern cooperative can explicitly adhere to the ICA
principles through the constituency provisions of the ULCAA, which
allow a cooperatives governing body to take into account “other coop-
erative values and principles.”404
Accordingly, as the conversation regarding the benefits and limita-
tions of social enterprise and specifically, the hybrid entities designed
to facilitate social enterprise continues, cooperatives should not be
forgotten.  Supporters and critics alike continue to debate the benefits
and viability of social enterprise.  Some jurisdictions have considered
providing special income tax and other benefits to hybrid entities;405
some commentators have gone as far as recommending for-profit
charity.406  Of course, commentators will continue to pursue obtaining
clarity from the IRS regarding the treatment of social enterprise
under the tax code, including easing PRI rules for social enterprise
entities.407
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FACILITATING CHARITABLE
INVESTMENTS IN COOPERATIVES
Critics of social enterprise entities rightfully point out a number of
potential issues with the new legal structures designed to encourage
investment in these enterprises.408  These issues are certainly present
in cooperative acting as a social enterprise in the same manner as they
would be with a benefit corporation or a L3C.  In addition, there are
challenges unique to cooperatives that can be clarified so as to con-
tinue encouraging experimentation and charitable investment in this
area.
403. For discussion of the Model Benefit Corporation Statute, see supra Section IV.B.
404. For discussion of section 720 of the ULCAA, see supra Section II.C.3.d.
405. Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 368, at n.12 (2014) (“For example, in Hawaii the initial R
legislation that would have created benefit corporations in that state included exemption from
state income tax, but the governor vetoed the final version of that legislation[.]”).  In addition,
Philadelphia offers a local tax credit to B Lab certified corporations. Id. at 421; see also THOMAS
J. BILLITTERI, NONPROFIT SECTOR RESEARCH FUND, MIXING MISSION AND BUSINESS: DOES
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE NEED A NEW LEGAL APPROACH? 6 (2007).
406. See generally Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (John M.
Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 304, 2006).
407. Kelley, supra note 391, at 355–58. R
408. Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 368, at 392. R
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A. Cleaning up State Statues
The enabling statues in many states create a confusing maze of
overlapping laws coupled with a lack of clarity.409  Due to the history
of haphazard growth of cooperative legislation, many states have
adopted multiple cooperative statutes.  A state may have adopted a
limited agricultural marketing cooperative statute based on the Stan-
dard Marketing Act, and then later enacted a general cooperative
statute.410  Some states have individual statutes for different types of
cooperatives: As of August 2015, twelve states had a specific statute
solely governing workers’ cooperatives.411  As pointed out by at least
one commentator, “the large variation in cooperative laws among
states invariably leads to shopping for the best state statute.”412
Additionally, many cooperative statutes are grafted on to the state’s
business corporation act for gap-filling provisions.  Again, much of
this is a historical relic, as it dates back to a time when the corporate
form was generally the only form of organization available.  These in-
teractions lead to confusion as to whether the cooperative is its own
type of entity or just a “flavor” of another type of corporation, and
how those different laws should interact.
In West Virginia,413 for example, a cooperative must comply with
the underlying statutes applicable to a business corporation,414 a bene-
fit corporation,415 or a nonprofit corporation.416  The provisions of the
Cooperative Association Act then limit the purposes and powers of
the corporate entity in order to fulfill its cooperative purpose.417  If
the cooperative chose to organize as a benefit corporation, it is argua-
409. See MARK J. Hanson, LAW OF COOPERATIVES: LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATIVE
DEVELOPMENT 10, http://www.agmrc.org/media/cms/legal_framework_21ae93b457eb7.pdf (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016).
410. For example, Missouri has separate stock and non-stock cooperative statutes, dating to
1923 and 1925.  It also has a commodity marketing act applicable to agricultural producers. See
id. at 95–96.
411. Update: Governor Brown Signs Worker Cooperative Law in California, DEMOCRACY AT
WORK INST. (Aug. 12, 2015), http://institute.coop/news/update-governor-brown-signs-worker-co-
operative-law-california.  Massachusetts, for example, has a general cooperative corporation
statute (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 157 (2014)), an employee cooperative statute (MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 157A (2014)), and a cooperative housing statute (MASS. GEN. LAWS  ch. 157B (2014)).
412. Hanson, supra note 99, at 95–96. R
413. West Virginia’s statute defines a cooperative association as “any corporation organized
under this article.  Each association shall also comply with the requisite business corporation
provisions of [business corporation act or the benefit corporation act] or the nonprofit corpora-
tion provisions . . . .” W. VA. CODE § 19-4-1(d) (2015).
414. See generally Business Corporation Act, W. VA. CODE ch. 31D (2015).
415. See generally Benefit Corporation Act, W. VA. CODE ch. 31F (2015).
416. See generally Nonprofit Corporation Act, W. VA. CODE ch. 31E (2015).
417. W. VA. CODE § 19-4-1 (2015) (regarding cooperative associations).
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ble that the benefit corporation’s constituency statute provisions418
would be incorporated into the cooperative’s structure.
Any conflict between the benefit corporation statute and the coop-
erative statute, however, is resolved in favor of the cooperative stat-
ute.419  Although the benefit corporation constituency statue in West
Virginia is mandatory,420 the cooperative allows the cooperative’s arti-
cles of incorporation to “contain any provisions managing, defining,
limiting or regulating the powers and affairs of the association, the
directors, the stockholders or the members of the association.”421  As
a result, a conflict may arise between the cooperative statute and the
benefit statute through provisions in the cooperative’s articles and by-
laws that alter the application of an otherwise mandatory constituency
statute.  In that case, it would be difficult to rely on incorporation of
the benefit corporation constituency provisions into the cooperative as
any structural evidence of charitability.
B. Follow the Path Set by the ULCAA
The Uniform Law Commission has already started the process of
consolidation and clarification of cooperative laws through the pro-
mulgation of the ULCAA.  In this regard, the drafting committee uti-
lized two very important guideposts in drafting the uniform statue:
recognition of traditional cooperative principles and flexibility.  In the
Prefatory Notes, the ULCAA specifically states that “Cooperative
values undergird and animate many of the Acts provisions” and spe-
cifically references the cooperative principles set out by the ICA.422  It
further states that the intention of the Act “is to expand the use of
entities recognizing cooperative principles.”423  The drafters explained
that the ULCAA “provides an efficient default template that encour-
ages planners to utilize tested cooperative principles that reflect tradi-
tional cooperative values at a deeper level than provided in those
other structures.”424
418. W. VA. CODE § 31F-4-401.
419. Sections 19-4-20 and 19-4-29 specifically state that if there is a conflict with the coopera-
tive association statute provisions, then the conflicting law shall be construed as not applicable to
the cooperative.
420. W. VA. CODE § 31F-4-401 (“[D]irectors of a benefit corporation . . . shall consider the
effect of any corporate action . . . .” (emphasis added)).
421. W. VA. CODE § 19-4-6; see also id. § 19-4-8 (allowing the bylaws to set “the qualifications,
compensation, duties, and terms of officers and directors . . . .” (emphasis added)).
422. ULCAA prefatory note at 4–5; see also supra Section II.C.3.c.
423. ULCAA prefatory note at 27.
424. Id. at 1.
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In addition, the Prefatory Note states that the Act “attempts to pro-
vide a flexible breastwork of mandatory and default rules that are
grounded in cooperative values and member governance.”425  As a re-
sult, the outlines of a cooperative organized under the statute are not
guaranteed to meet the Subchapter S definition or the Cap-
per–Volstead Act’s definition of a cooperative.  On the other hand,
the cooperative can tailor its terms to its specific needs.
C. Choosing between the NGC and the Traditional Cooperative
One of the downsides of modern NGC legislation and the ULCAA
is that they allow an organization to deviate from some traditional
cooperative principles by allowing for a class of non-member capital
that has a vote in management.  On the other hand, the Wisconsin
NGC and the ULCAA contain the most explicit legislative adoption
of the core cooperative values of community, economic opportunity,
and sustainability.
Because the ULCAA is designed for flexibility, it can accommodate
a cooperative that is organized under traditional cooperative princi-
ples, as well as a cooperative that takes advantage of NGC features
for purposes of capital formation.426  For a cooperative that wants to
function in the social enterprise area, it can draft its purpose and
membership provisions specifically to  incorporate the hallmarks of
charitable economic development set forth by the various IRS admin-
istrative guidance and emphasize employment, community revitaliza-
tion, and education.  Similarly, it could tailor its membership
requirements to make sure that the cooperative is primarily serving a
charitable class so as to avoid private benefit issues.
As a result of this tailoring, a social enterprise cooperative could
eschew the ability to take on most non-member capital.  One of the
critiques of the NGC legislation is that there is an inherent conflict
between the traditional cooperative purpose of member service and
the needs of capital—a conflict avoided when the membership is the
capital.  If member capital is insufficient and venture capital is inap-
propriate, then charitable capital can fill the gap.  By definition, part
of the purpose of a mission-related (or the primary reason, for a
PRI)427 is to accomplish a charitable purpose.  If the cooperative’s
member service accomplishes the charitable purpose, then there is no
425. Id. at 26.
426. Id. at 3 (“Importantly, this draft is flexible enough to form a limited cooperative which
operates like a traditional cooperative.  Indeed, none of the new features are required; rather,
they are permitted.”).
427. See supra Section IV.A.
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conflict between the needs of the members and the needs of the chari-
table investor.
To facilitate charitable investment, the ULCAA could be more ob-
vious in the creation of a traditional cooperative path in the statute.
As currently drafted, there are so many options available to a cooper-
ative that can be difficult to determine what is a “traditional” provi-
sion and what is a “NGC” provision.  For smaller cooperatives, this
might be more detail than needed.  Similarly, a charity making a mis-
sion-related or program-related investment in a cooperative will need
to develop a significant amount of internal expertise in cooperative
structure to navigate through the various options.  One of the
strengths of the benefit corporation or the L3C is that the statutory
provisions are self-contained.  Formally distinguishing between tradi-
tional movement cooperatives and NGCs in the statute (along the
lines of the distinction between the LLC and the L3C) could adminis-
tratively facilitate the investment of charitable capital in cooperatives.
The one allowable variation from a traditional cooperative structure,
however, would be to allow charitable organizations to provide non-
member capital, to fill the gap otherwise left by the exclusion of ven-
ture capital funding.
D. Enhanced Definitions of Charitability and Accountability
As indicated by many commentators, social enterprise organiza-
tions suffer from two major flaws: a lack of a clearly defined quantum
of public good, and a lack of accountability and enforcement.  Profes-
sor Dana Brakman Reiser has noted, “What begins as philanthropic
mission could, as a result of it being embedded within a business, be-
come biased toward alignment with the goals of the for-profit
company.”428
Nothing in most L3C or benefit corporation legislation requires
some minimum standard of charitable benefit.  A L3C must have low
profit, but no one really knows how low.429  A benefit corporation
must have a general public good as part of its purpose, but no one
really knows how much.430  In each case, there is no stakeholder that
has an interest in pursuing and defending the public good that is theo-
428. Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2465 (2009);
see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 609–10 (2011).
429. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestral, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Liability
Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneur-
ial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 292–93 (2010).
430. See Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 428, at 610–11. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL404.txt unknown Seq: 66 20-SEP-17 14:54
1078 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1013
retically inherent in the structure of the organization.  Very few juris-
dictions give the Attorney General or other governmental authority
standing to enforce the public purpose of these entities.431
One of the differences between the L3C and the benefit corpora-
tion, on the one hand, and the cooperative on the other hand, is that
the cooperative does have a constituency to defend any charitable
purpose: its members.  If by definition a social enterprise cooperative
has, in part, a mission to provide services to its members that qualify
as charitable—such as employment opportunities—then the members
themselves have an interest in seeing those purposes furthered.  More-
over, to the extent that the ULCAA allows for a non-member charita-
ble investor class, such as a foundation making a PRI, that investor
clearly has the standing and the ability to enforce those provisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inherent in the nature of the cooperative are a set of values: democ-
racy, sustainability, economic opportunity, and self-determination.  As
a social matter, cooperatives bind communities of individuals who as-
sociate for their common good.  As an economic matter, cooperatives
allow their members to pursue these goals free from the constraints of
the profit motivation of a separate capital class.  From a legal perspec-
tive, cooperatives provide a structure where charitable values can be
pursued simultaneously with economic benefit.  As such, cooperatives
truly can be considered the first social enterprise.
Randall Torgerson, the former Deputy Administrator for Coopera-
tive Services for the USDA, once observed:
Cooperatives by virtue of their structure are embedded by owner-
ship, use, benefit and governance in rural areas.  The benefits of
cooperatives in rural settings are decentralization of decision mak-
ing and distribution of wealth generation locally.  The very nature of
the organization brings empowerment to rural people generally and
specifically to rural communities.  The impact of cooperative opera-
tions can therefore can be viewed as a public developmental good at
the grass roots level.432
Although Mr. Torgeson’s comments specifically address rural coop-
eratives, his thoughts are universally applicable to all cooperatives.
431. Illinois’ L3C legislation explicitly subjects a L3C to the state’s Charitable Trust Act. See
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(d) (2014); Charitable Trust Act, 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/1 (2014);
see also Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public
Is Private Philanthropy, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 579–80 (2010); Mayer & Ganahl, supra note
368, at 399–400 (discussing the weaknesses of current oversight of social enterprise R
organizations).
432. Torgerson et al., supra note 51. R
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Cooperatives empower their members to determine the services nec-
essary to bring economic development, employment opportunities,
and education and sustainability to their communities.  These charita-
ble values are inherent in the nature of the cooperative, and as such,
should cause the cooperative to be a part of the larger dialogue re-
garding the role of social enterprise in assisting individuals and com-
munities in need.
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